ملف رقم ٤٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩١٢ "السكة الحديدية العابرة لبلاد فارس" [ظ‎‎٤‎٨] (٣٣٠/١٠١)

6
No. 6.
Finally, is the Trans-Persian Railway inevitable ? It has recently been argued with some
force that it is not: and if by a Trans-Persian Railway is understood the junction of the Indian
and Russian railways then, except perhaps as regards the distant future, the conclusion seems
correct.
But it does not necessarily follow that many of the lines which might ultimately form
connecting links in a trunk railway are not inevitable, and perhaps this distinction has not been
sufficiently brought out.
It is presumed that a railway is only inevitable if it is certain that it will pay, or if it is
necessary to the parties concerned for commercial or political reasons. If these tests be adopted,
a fair case can be made out to show that the greater part of the Trans-Persian project is
inevitable. It probably is so from the Russian frontier at Astara to the shores of the Persian
Gulf and to the limit of the British sphere at Sunder Abbas.
The parties concerned are India, Persia, Russia, and Germany.
The advantages to Indian and British trade of securing railway access to north-west and
north Persia have been touched upon already. The British Resident in the Persian Gulf has
expressed the belief that both Indian and British trade would benefit by the projected railway,
and find new openings.
As regards Persia, Sir P. Cox, in the light of local experience, has stated “ it cannot but be
supposed that the general effect of the railway would be to improve the administration, develop
the country, and increase the capacity of the Persian market.” It has, on the other hand, been
argued that Persia, while likely to benefit greatly by British railways from the Gulf, has nothing
to gain by the extension of the Russian line east of Yezd: but surely this estimate makes
insufficient allowance for the administrative advantage of connecting the Central Government at
Tehran with the outlying provinces by direct communication.
As regards Russia, it can hardly be denied that she would derive benefit from commercial
access to the shores of the Persian Gulf.
As regards Germany, it would seem that a large portion of her trade is likely to come by
sea, and to pass up inland from the Gulf. It is urged, however, that if a Trans-Persian line is
inevitable it will not be the Russian project, but a Gei-man extension from Khanikin to Yezd,
which is likely to ruin the Russian scheme, on the ground that the Germans can and will effect a
short circuit.
This criticism appears to refer to a through traffic from Europe to India : it is not quite clear
why it is held to be shorter via the German than via the Russian route, nor why the Germans can
be so assured as to obtaining the extension to Yezd, but even if they do obtain it there is no
palpable reason for concluding that a Russian line from Tehran to Yezd, and a possible extension
of that Russian line to the Persian Gulf, should be ruined by a German line coming from a totally
different direction, Khanikin.
The upshot seems to be that, even if His Majesty’s Government adopt an attitude of detach
ment, a great portion of a Trans-Persian project seems so likely to be carried out as almost to
justify the epithet of “inevitable.”
It remains to consider what the attitude of His
Majesty’s Government should be : they have
agreed to support the Societe at Tehran in
seeking for a “ limited ” option for a railway
across Persia : that is, an option which, outside
the Russian sphere, is not to be exercised until
His Majesty’s Government consider it politic and
feasible.
It seems advisable that the attitude of His
Majesty s Government should be comprehensively
defined, for purposes of record, in a communication
to the Russian Ambassador; this communication
should contain, as an enclosure, a copy of the
proposed reply (vide infra) to Sir W. Garstin;
it should in particular recall that one of the
reservations made by his Majesty’s Government
from the fiist was that there should be absolute
equality of treatment over the whole system, and
it should suggest that, before an application for
an option is made at Tehran, the British and
Russian Governments should formally signify to