ملف رقم ٤٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩١٢ "السكة الحديدية العابرة لبلاد فارس" [و‎‎٤‎٨] (٣٣٠/١٠٠)

(b.) llie prospects of Bunder Abbas developing as a port are not dependent solely on tbe
construction of the irans-Persian Railway: such development may also come about if a line is
built from Bunder Abbas to Kerman or Shiraz.
. r £ h ? supposed loss to Indian revenues from the line to Karachi rests on the assumption
that ms Majesty s Government are pledged to a junction of the Indian and Russian systems:
they .have only assented to this m principle, and the consummation is dependent on being both
politic and feasible. Having regard to the reservations made by His Majesty’s Government
respecting financial liability, it is difficult to see how the Government of India can be called upon
to build the section in British Baluchistan : indeed, having regard to the unremunerative character
of any line between Bunder Abbas and Karachi, it is highly improbable, in the absence of a
discovery of gieat mineral wealth, that the line will be prolonged beyond Bunder Abbas, unless,
m Hie com se of time, there should be a sufficient surplus on the lines west of Bunder Abbas to
enable the bociete to hand over annually such a sum as would cover any loss on the section
built by the Government of India in British Baluchistan.
No. 5.
dhe next point is this assuming, merely for the sake of argument, that a Trans-Persian
Railway project is likely in whole or in part to be realised, can we gain any strategical or
political advantage by participation?
It has been concluded by military authorities that if we can determine the alignment
and break of gauge, and it we can lay down other conditions, then, even if we are not in a
position to render wholly innocuous, we shall yet be able to blunt, what in some quarters is
considered a potential weapon of offence.
If, therefore,^ participation will secure this advantage, it is desirable strategically, unless it
can be shown to involve greater disadvantages in other directions.
The possible drawback is that our participation may hasten the advent of the line as far as
Yezd; but in any case, whether v r e participate or not, the Trans-Persian line is ultimately
going up to the limits of the Russian sphere, and when once the line is built so far it will
be a natural development if Russian trade expands into the neutral sphere. Such expansion
of trade might reasonably be followed by a prolongation of the Russian line into the neutral
sphere, and as this would be in no sense opposed to the Convention of 1907 we could raise no
objection.
By participation now we might stipulate that no such extension of the Trans-Persian line into
the neutral sphere should be in the direction of the alleged danger-point, Kerman. We should
then, in the unlikely event of Russia becoming hostile, have ample warning before an extension
to Kerman could be made. If, on the other hand, we abstain from participation, a Russian
extension may be made to Kerman, primarily to meet the developments of trade, and we shall have
no valid ground of objection.
Turning now to the political side, what are the advantages to us of participation ?
Generally speaking, it may be said that co-operation with Russia is, when practicable,
primd facie desirable : it is a natural sequence of the Anglo-Russian Convention, and ithas much to
commend it, not merely in Persia, where it affords a chance for a comprehensive settlement of
the whole railway question, but also in the larger sphere of European politics. M. Sazonoff,
in a memorandum dated the 27th September, 1912, has expressed the view that, if the request
for an option were made to the Persian Government by the French end Russian groups alone,
such a procedure “ produirait une impression tres facheuse, et serait, sans doute, utilisee comme
in dice d’un dissentiment profond entre la Grande-Bretagne et la Russie.”
What, on the other hand, may be the result of refusing co-operation ? It may be to bring
about a Russo-German combination, first commercial and then political, in the Middle East.
Such a consummation would be far reaching in its consequences, and could not fail to evoke
serious migivings ; and it would, in the event of trouble between England and Germany, to say
nothing of the efiects in Europe, expose India to the risk of a combined attack by Germany
and Russia.
Two possible objections suggest themselves: it may be urged that German and Russian
interests in the Middle East are so divergent that a reconciliation is virtually impracticable, and it
may be urged that the existence of a Trans-Persian Railway would be no safeguard against such
a combination should it become a fact.
The answer to the first objection is that the Potsdam agreement has shown Russian and
German interests in the Middle East not to be irreconcilable. The substance of agreement was
(a) Russia undertook not to oppose the Bagdad Railway ; (b) Russia undertook to link Tehran
with the Bagdad Railway at Khanikin, and Germany secured the concession from Tehran to
Khanikin in the event of construction by Russia not commencing within a prescribed term ;
(c) Germany recognised Russia’s special interests in North Persia.
It is easy to see how this agreement might develop if Great Britain were to meet Russian
advances for railway co-operation by a nun possumus attitude. Russia might seek to divert
German activity from the Khanikin-Tehran concession to the neutral sphere, where Russian
interests are less important, and the change would be effected at British expense.
As to the existence of a Trans-Persian Railway being no safeguard against a Russo-German
combination, the argument advanced should rather be that if Great Britain and Russia, by
a well-considered scheme of co-operation, have earmarked desirable concessions, forming
connecting links in a possible Trans-Persian line, then there is less scope for a Russo-German
combination.