ملف رقم ٤٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩١٢ "السكة الحديدية العابرة لبلاد فارس" [و‎‎٤‎٢] (٣٣٠/٨٨)

on the Russian side in order to support the scheme. The next step consists in the
formation of the “ societe d’etudes” and depends wholly on the attitude of the British
Government and of competent circles in England.
Latest Events in Politics. —The latest events may influence to a certain extent that
^attitude and make necessary some observations about what we consider as the
favourable political consequences of our scheme, which is a direct result of the Anglo-
Bussian agreement and of the mutual confidence which has arisen as its sequel. Alter
the division of Persia into spheres of influence, the interest of both England and
Russia in that country have become identical as far as they are in touch. The
integrity of Persia is now a political necessity to both countries and can be assured
in the best way by a well-organised Government and by a great railway trunk, which
is a guarantee of neutralisation. The absolute lack of improved means of communication
makes the regeneration of Persia an impossible task, and the situation may be resumed
in a very few words—no roads, especially no railroads, and no resources to keep up
order. On the other hand, as a preliminary to the construction of railways, the
question of Government guarantees crops up again.
We will repeat here that this last question can be solved adequately only by the
construction of a great central trunk line through Persia, with the embranchments
necessary for the development of the country. On the other hand, the various plans
which are now under discussion imply a great expenditure, whilst they lack the
principal financial asset of the trans-Persian railway—the direct communication with
India.
Khanikme-Tehran .—The Khanikme—Tehran line, to which Russia has a right of
preference, would lose a great part of its signification and would become financially
a difficult problem when a through line running from Baku to Kurrachee would have
come into existence. Indian goods will certainly use the direct way, and European
goods would find it shorter and cheaper by Russia. In any case, the Khanikine line
would have to be built in competition with railways already existing, and there could
never be a serious danger of preference tariffs on that line.
Other proposed Railways. —We may as well point out here a certain contradiction
which has made itself felt when the question of Persian railways was discussed in
various quarters. The same who express doubts about the financial realisation of the
trans-Persian scheme advocate a series of railways which would cover the Persian
territory with a very expensive spiders web. In*that respect we will mention, besides
the Khanikine-Tehran Railway, the Trebizond—Van-Khoi line, the Shuster—Tehran line,
the Nushki-Seistan line, and, on the Russian side, Enzeli-Tehran and several other
lines of penetration. It is evident that these lines, put together, greatly surpass the
total length of the projected route. It is strange that they should seem realisable,
although their commercial and political value is very small indeed when compared with
the overland way to India.
General Advantages. —There is no need to discuss here at any length the various
political problems which arise in relation to our scheme. The advantages of the proposed
railway can be summarised shortly as follows:—
1. It is the shortest line. Wff do not mean that it is the shortest link between
the Indian and the European railway systems, which would be over Afghanistan, and
not over Persia. What we mean is the shortest through line, Calais-Calcutta or
Calais-Bombay, taking into consideration Ihe railways already existing, the journey,
London-Calcutta, will be possible in less than eight days.
2. It is an uninterrupted line, with no sea to cross from the Channel up to India.
3. It is the cheapest line for goods and passengers owing to the low Russian tariff,
applied to 36 per cent, of the distance, Calais-Bombay. The first-class fare, London—
Bombay, wifi be less than 401 It is also the cheapest to build, thanks to geographical
conditions, whereas any line in Southern or Western Persia presents very seimus
difficulties. *
4. It is the most favourable line politically, as 84 per cent, of the whole distance
from India to Bomba.y is under British or Russian control; whereas the Bagdad line,
for instance, depends even more than the Suez Canal on the attitude of Turkey
One may add that with the construction of the trans-Persian railway the situation
in the Mediterranean loses a part of its vital importance for Imperial communications.
Any Russian port—even Archangel—may prove useful for the transport to India of
British troops. .... ....
5. It does not unite the Moslem world of Turkey with their corehgionanes m
India.