ملف رقم ٤٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩١٢ "السكة الحديدية العابرة لبلاد فارس" [و‎‎٥] (٣٣٠/١٤)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.]
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PERSIA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[March 10.]
Section 1.
[10989] No - L
Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—{Received March 10.)
St. Petershuryh, March 5, 1913.
IN the course of a conversation which I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs
on the 1st of this month, I reverted to the question of the trans-Persian railway scheme,
and said that it appeared from figures with which you had supplied me that the
distance between Ispahan and Moscow was shorter by loO miles than that between
Ispahan and Constantinople. There could, therefore, be no danger of the through
European traffic being diverted to the Bagdad Railway, were our proposed alignment
to be carried out. The northern route via Russia would, I also pointed out, be
considerably shortened were goods for the European markets to be dispatched
westwards from Rostof instead of being carried so far north as Moscow.
His Excellency admitted the truth of the latter contention, hut said that though he
was not in a position to affirm straight oh that the figures which I had given him were
inaccurate, a study of the atlas had left on him an exactly contrary impiession. e
was still, he continued, of the opinion that the railway ought to be carried more to the
east and to pass by Yezd instead of Ispahan. I repeated what I had already said on a
former occasion, that this would not by itself prevent the Bagdad Railway being
eventually linked up with the trans-Persian railway. His Excellency would also no
doubt remember that we had always made our approval of the latter scheme subject to
certain conditions, of which the alignment was one, and that we had stated that the
railway must in any case enter the British sphere at Bunder Abbas. It was extremely
doubtful whether the through traffic from and to Europe would contribute to any
considerable extent to the success of the enterprise, and if British financiers were to be
induced to co-operate, it was necessary to choose an alignment which by reason ol local
conditions was likely to prove remunerative. The one which we had now proposed
offered substantial local advantages, which would more than compensate for the
increased length of the line, and I personally believed that it was the only practical one. |
Persia was a thinly populated country, and it was impossible to fix the trace of the
trans-Persian railway by drawing a straight line on the map from one town to another,
as the Emperor Nicholas I. had done in the case of the St. I etersburgh Moscow
Railway. On M. Sazonof remarking that in spite of this mode of procedure the latter
railway was a most paying concern, 1 said that the conditions were entirely different,
as in Russia the demand for railway accommodation was greater than the supply. As
his Excellency still seemed inclined to insist on the advantages of keeping tne
alignment at as great a distance as possible from the Bagdad Railway, I endeavoured
to impress on him, as instructed by your telegram No. 17,. of the dbth ultimo that the
best way to avoid an extension of the German railway system into 1 ersia was foi Gieat
Britain and Russia to carry out with the least possible delay some well considered
scheme of railway construction in that country. The one which you had now suggested
seemed to me admirably suited for the purpose, and I therefore trusted that it would
meet with his approval. His Excellency did not take exception to what 1 had said, but
remarked that it might perhaps be well for us also to take in hand the construction of
a line from Ispahan to Khorremabad. In the course of our subsequent conversation
he even went so far as to say that perhaps the best plan would be for us to drop the
larger scheme altogether and for Russia to construct a line to Tehran, while we might
build some railway in the south. As I thought that this remark might have een
prompted by a desire to.prevent our seaborne goods being carried northwaids o
Ispahan and Tehran, I observed that the Persian Government was not likely to grant a
concession for a line to Tehran except as part of a trunk line running down to the
If
In a conversation which I had with M. Sazonof yesterday I communicated to him
the information contained in your telegram No. 176 of the 1st instant respecting the
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