"XXII\٨ سكة حديد بغداد" [و‎‎٧‎٤] (١٩٤/١٤٣)

THE NEAR EAST
7 i
May 23, 1913.
THE BAGHDAD RAILWAY AND
PERSIAN GULF AGREEMENT.
The accompanying map covers tlie chief portion of the
region immediately affected by the impending agreement
between Great Britain and Turkey. In regard to the
Persian Gulf, it is now considered certain that the
agreement will provide: (1) for the recognition by Great
Britain of the suzerainty of the Porte over Koweit,
which is to be an autonomous kaza of the Ottoman
Empire; (2) for an undertaking on the part of the
Porte not to interfere in the internal affairs of Koweit
or in the question of succession and for the recognition
of the conventions concluded between the Sheikh of
Koweit and the British Government; (3) for the
abandonment by the Porte of all its pretensions to
suzerainty over the peninsula of El Katr, the Bahrein j
Arab difficulty will be found in the establishment of an
Ottoman Commission, with strong British participation,
to exercise independently all the functions of a naviga
tion and port authority. The heads of both the inspec
tion and engineer branches would in this case have to be
British.
In this connection we would again direct attention to
the condition of the Tigris river, which calls for con
servancy measures in the interests of the Turkish and
British steamers using its waters. As Sir William
Willcocks has pointed out, by an expenditure of a rela
tively small amount upon the construction of three regu
lators the wastage of water that now takes place could be
checked, and a channel of sufficient depth for naviga
tion by the shallow-draught boats now employed should
be made available at all seasons of the year.
An agreement regarding the contemplated extension
of the Baghdad Railway towards the Persian Gulf does
THE BAGHDAD-PERSIAN GULF REGION.
Islands, Muscat, and the territory of the trucial chiefs ;
(4) for the recognition by the Porte of the right of
Great Britain to undertake the duty of lighting, buoy
ing, and policing the Gulf. . .
Other outstanding matters between Great Britain
and Turkey in these regions concern the navigation of
the Tigris, the Euphrates, and the Shatt-el-Arab, and
the frontier between Turkey and Persia. On the Tigris
and Euphrates Great Britain enjoys certain rights and
privileges, which in any permanent understanding with
the Porte require to be defined and acknowledged. On
the Shatt-el-Arab the question of navigation involves
additional duties, including dredging, buoying, light
ing, and policing, which, in the absence of any attempt
on 3 Turkey’s part to carry them out, have had to be per
formed by Great Britain in the interests of British trade,
which is paramount in these waters. According to the
forecast given by the Times of the agreements with
Turkey, it is probable that a solution of the Shatt-el-
not imply that the scheme will necessarily be carried
out in the near future. The British Government,
however, rightly insists on a clear understanding regard
ing the project, with a view to safeguarding British
interests in the Middle East. The preponderance of
British trade requires that the control of such a rail
way should not pass into hostile hands. Of the various
schemes proposed in order to make provision for the
“ open door ” in the letter and in the spirit on this line
the one that appears to have been finally selected is that
Great Britain should be represented on the Board of
the Baghdad Railway. The terminus will naturally be
at Busreh. The proposal that the line should be
continued to Koweit (as indicated on the map) coula
never be entertained by Great Britain. If in the fulness
of time Koweit requires to be connected by railway with
Busreh the question is one for Great Britain and Turkey
to decide, and not the Baghdad Railway Administra
tion.