مجموعة ٦/ ١٩ "الجزيرة العربية: (المملكة العربية السعودية) التقرير السنوي لمملكة الحجاز ونجد." [ظ‎‎٢‎٥‎٦] (٥٤٠/٥١٣)

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material for the colonies. Thus the Mutair, a tribe in which revolt was wide
spread, if not universal, account for 13,200 men in the above total of 65,300.
Artawiya, which was the first of the colonies, and is described by Mr. Philby in
his recent book on Arabia as being “ as it were the cathedral town of the Akhwan
movement,” was a rebel centre. It can hardly be supposed that the rebellion,
however successfully it was suppressed, can have been without its effect on th«
organisation considered as a military instrument in the hands of Ibn Sand, for h?
saw it turned against him in 1929 by motive forces which included the fanatical
Wahhabism that he had himself made the inspiration of the Akhwan.
Mr. Philby, writing in 1930, ignores this, and still speaks in his book of the
Akhwan as the corner-stone of Ibn Sand’s military power. “ The man-power of
those colonies,” he says, “ each of which is in effect the cantonment of a permanent
territorial force, constitutes the bulk of what may be regarded as his regular
army.”
133b. It may be inferred from the meagre data available that it would be
equally rash to assume that Ibn Sand could now count for all purposes on fighting
forces in Nejd on the scale indicated by Mr. Rihani and Mr. Philby, or, on the
other hand, to assume that he could not count on them for the purposes of a foreign
adventure. Ihe matter deserves further attention on the part of those responsible
for the defence of Iraq and Kowait, who are much closer to Nejd than is the
Legation in Jedda.
133c. In the meantime the King has turned his attention in the Hejaz to
the creation of the embryo of a regular army on European lines. In September
1930 it was announced that a certain Nabi Bey A1 Adhma, a Syrian ex-officer in
the Turkish Army, had been appointed Director of Military Organisation. This
officer resigned his post after a short tenure and was replaced by one Faudhi Bey
a man of the same type, German trained, and at one time concerned
m the rebellion against the French in Syria. He appears to be a man of intelli-
and energy. Army organisation (including the purchase of aeroplanes,
which will be dealt with in the next section) was mentioned in a list of the
achievements published in the Mecca newspaper ” Umm-al-Qura ” of the
3rd October to which reference has already been made. The results achieved up
to the end of the year may be gauged by the show made at a review held in Jedda
early m January 1931 to celebrate the King’s accession. It is probable that the
forces present represented the bulk of the regular army in the Hejaz. They
consisted of two fairly workmanlike detachments of infantry, about 500 men in
all; pack animals with various equipment and about 100 men in charge; two
armoured cars; an ill-mounted and disorderly rabble of less than forty men
forming tlm ‘‘cavalry ”; and a much more impressive camel corps of upwards of
320 men. Although this experiment is being tried in the Hejaz, it would appear
that the elements in the force are largely Nejdi. The King’s ultimate ideal would
appear to be to have a regular army to serve his purposes in both kingdoms.
VI.— Aviation.
134. When Ibn Sand conquered the Hejaz, his prize of war included a
certain number of aeroplanes, and he evolved the idea of possessing a small air
orce. In and after 1926 the question of his obtaining British assistance to
achieve this object was the subject of continuous negotiations, at first with a view
to his securing British personnel and finally to his obtaining not only personnel
but equipment under the auspices of His Majesty’s Government in the United
Kingdom. It had become apparent from the report of Wing-Commander F. W.
Stent who visited Jedda in June 1929, that the existing machines could be put
to little use except for practice and light flying. At that time Ibn Saud was very
eager, perhaps because he hoped that an air force would help him to dominate the
rebellious tribes with which he was having so much trouble. His Majesty’s
Government were no less eager to help him for reasons of general policy from
a desire not to see him turn elsewhere for what he wanted and from an ulterior
nf n W1 be dea J w ! th L ‘J t r er ' tv r The scheme came to fruition in the autumn
ot 1929. it was agreed that His Majesty’s Government should supply four
Wapiti aeroplanes and equipment, and should put the King in the way of