مجموعة ٦/ ١٩ "الجزيرة العربية: (المملكة العربية السعودية) التقرير السنوي لمملكة الحجاز ونجد." [و‎‎٢‎٤‎٧] (٥٤٠/٤٩٤)

[5545] c 3
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ignore a good deal of what had already passed, hut it must he
remembered that at no time had the Government of India contemplated
negotiations other than personal negotiations between Colonel Biscoe
and I bn Baud.
(4) During practically the whole year and up to its close the trivial Bahrain
incident enveloped in a mist any prospect of serious negotiations,
whether initiated by His Majesty’s Government or by Ibn Baud.
59. To complete the picture it may he added that one minor question, that
of the treatment of Bahrainis in Jbn Baud’s territory, remained outstanding;
and that the main progress made during the latter part of the year was the
preparation on the British side of a draft agreement on the lines of the Bahra
Agreement, but of more limited scope. The question of the Bahrainis will be
explained more fully in another connexion later (see paragraph 199 below).
Another question, that of proposed pearling flights between Bahrain and Basra,
will he dealt with in the section on aviation.
(B )—Relations with Powers outside A rabia.
(1) British Empire.
(a) His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.
HO. So far as Ibn Baud is concerned, Great Britain is the one European
Power permanently and continuously concerned with Arabia. Our relations with
him therefore run through almost the whole of this report. They turn largely on
the questions affecting the Arab countries in regard to which His Majesty’s
Government have a special position and are to that extent dealt with in the
preceding paragraphs. Various other aspects of them will be dealt with in
special sections relative to trade, &c., aviation, the pilgrimage, slavery, the
British naval position and miscellaneous matters.
HI. As for our general position vis-d-vis Ibn Baud, it may be said that the
strain, to which our relations are constantly subjected by the number and delicacy
of the questions arising in connexion with Transjordan, Iraq and the Persian
Gulf, is eased by his genuine desire to stand well with us. This desire is dictated
by reasons of general policy and a lively sense that Great Britain is the one Power
that counts politically in the peninsula; perhaps by a sentiment of past connexion;
perhaps also by the hope of future favours. The desire co-exists with the
suspicion of the western world and fear of encroachment common among Moslems
of his type; hut our greatest difficulty arises from the King’s inability to under
stand or unwillingness to recognise that His Majesty's Government do not
completely control the rulers and Governments with whom they are in special
relations, especially in the case of Iraq and Transjordan. Hating the Hashimites
as he does, he likes to regard their territories as British dependencies. His
dislike of the practical position is intensified by his knowledge that, while his
own relations with His Majesty’s Government are in the hands of the Foreign
Office, British control, such as it is, over the adjoining countries with which he is
at loggerheads is exercised by other Departments, viz., the Colonial Office and
the India Office. It is an object of his policy to assert the position
that, as an independent monarch, he is only concerned with the
department of His Majesty’s Government responsible for foreign affairs, and he
hates to think that half the handling of the political questions which concern
him lies with other British authorities. This is one of the reasons for his growing
reluctance to deal with Great Britain through representatives dependent on the
Colonial Office or the Government of India, who, in the view of His Majesty’s
Government, are more qualified to deal with questions affecting the eastern side of
his dominions than a Minister in Jedda can be.
62. The creation of a British Legation in Jedda in the autumn of 1929
was a feather in the cap of a monarch who wishes above all things to treat on
equal terms with other Powers and who had himself suggested the change. His
success in this direction was complete when a Minister was actually appointed
towards the end of January 1930. By that time he already had at his court a
Soviet Minister, but he has little use for Bolsheviks and Russia has no real
interests in the Hejaz. Some other Powers had turned their consulates into some-