مجموعة ٦/ ١٩ "الجزيرة العربية: (المملكة العربية السعودية) التقرير السنوي لمملكة الحجاز ونجد." [و‎‎١‎١‎٤] (٥٤٠/٢٢٨)

[13078] B 11
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Hejaz until after Fuad Bey Hamza’s return. It was not until the 29th November
that a conversation between Fuad Bey and Sir Andrew Ryan in Riyadh put a
more serious complexion on the whole business. Fuad Bey said that the Italians
had now offered to give the Saudi Government £500,000 gold, or rather the
equivalent of most of that amount in arms, the rest perhaps in cash, in return
for half the original number of camels. He was positive that no other condition
was attached to the offer. He expatiated on the King’s suspicions of the Italian
policy but also on the danger of offending the Italian Government, unless the
Saudi Government could look for support elsewhere. He stated three problems,
as follows :—
(1) If Italy menaced Saudi Arabia, could the latter count on the same
support as had been accorded to Abyssinia? (It was fairly clear at
the time and became even clearer afterwards that in Ibn Saud’s view
Italian action in the Yemen would constitute such a menace no less
than direct action against Saudi Arabia.)
(2) If it were said that Saudi Arabia was not, like Abyssinia, a member of
the League of Nations, would not the slavery settlement under negotia
tion with His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom make it
possible for Saudi Arabia to enter the League ?
(3) If the suggested Italian menace were in sight, could the Saudi Govern
ment count on material support from His Majesty’s Government?
85. Fuad Bey explained that he was delaying his return to Jedda, in order
to postpone his reply to the Italian offer until His Majesty’s Government should
have had time to express their views. Their views were stated in a Foreign Office
telegram of the 20th December. While His Majesty’s Government could obviously
not reply definitely, much less in the affirmative, to Fuad Bey’s questions, the
instructions enabled Sir Andrew Ryan to make a temporising statement, designed
to dissuade the Saudi Government from throwing themselves into the arms of
the Italians, when they met in Jedda on the 22nd December. Inter alia, he read
the text of the fourth conclusion arrived at in the Anglo-Italian conversations in
Rome early in 1927, to show, though naturally without any commitment, vis-a-vis
Saudi Arabia regarding future British action, what strong grounds His Majesty’s
Government would have for opposing any attempt by the Italians to establish
themselves anywhere on the Red Sea coast of Arabia. Sir Andrew Ryan’s state
ment seemed to produce a good effect. In order to enhance this he was authorised
on the 31st December to communicate confidentially in writing to Fuad Bey all
the conclusions arrived at in the Rome conversations having any bearing on the
matter, i.e., paragraphs 2 to 4 of the record of the 7th February, 1927.
86. An interesting sidelight on the Odello business is the statement of a
fairly reliable informant on the 15th November that Odello was pressing his
higher authorities for permission to offer the Saudi Government money to pay off
their debt to His Majesty’s Government,
87. Ibn Saud is probably sincere both in his suspicions of Italy and in his
desire to avoid offending her. It is much more difficult to gauge the personal
sentiments of other Saudi personages concerned in the above transactions and of
such members of the Royal family as the King consults. The subject is too
speculative to enlarge upon. It may be said that Sheikh \usuf \ asin seemed
to be greatly impressed by the pecuniary advantage of selling camels and, unlike
Fuad Bey afterwards, pretended that the camel deals were purely commercial
transactions, to be allowed or disallowed by the Government, luad Bey is widely
believed in the Hejaz to be hand and glove with the Italians, notwithstanding
the strong assurances that he gave to Sir Andrew Ryan in Riyadh of his personal
belief in the King’s policy of reliance on Great Britain. Both men have been
accused of having received bribes or promises of personal gain from the Italians.
Such accusations are lightly made in Arabia, and while they cannot be dismissed
outright, it seems probable that both, and especially Fuad Bey Hamza, are more
influenced by their ambitions as Arab nationalists than by the hope of profit.
They are in close relations with the small minority of Nationalists in Palestine
and Syria who have lent themselves to Italian propaganda.
88. As the King’s attitude has evolved, he has doubtless had to reckon
increasingly with the widespread hostility of Arabs, with the exception of the