مجموعة ٦/ ١٩ "الجزيرة العربية: (المملكة العربية السعودية) التقرير السنوي لمملكة الحجاز ونجد." [ظ‎‎٥‎٩] (٥٤٠/١١٩)

24
Ai ftbs in particular, was well known. I he Italians had used the pilnrirnasre for
propaganda purposes, and had done the A best to induce him to speak in praise
of their pro-Moslem policy. He had resisted this attempt, and he had no belief
whatever in Italian professions, for he knew what had happened in Tripoli and
in Abyssinia, but there was a real danger from the Italians, nevertheless, if the
troubles in Palestine should flare up again. Nor were the Turks inactive. They
had many agents in Palestine, who never failed to rub it into the Arabs that
the result of their revolt against the Turks was subordination to the Jews.
89. The series of interviews ended with one last question from Ibn Saud.
Suppose that there was trouble in the Yemen and the Italians asked him about
it, as they might very well do; what should he say? Should he reply to this
effect:—
He did not propose to interfere in the internal affairs of the Yemen,
and the Rome understanding of 1927, the relevant part of which had been
communicated to him by the Italians as well as by the British, seemed to
require them both to adopt a similar attitude of non-intervention.
Mr. Rendel said that this reply seemed to meet the circumstances exactly.
90. When Sir R. Bullard visited Riyadh in July Ibn Saud expressed his
confidence in His Majesty s Government and the British in remarkably strong
terms- It must be remembered that he had only just received the report of the
Royal Commission on Palestine, and that not only had he had no time to consider
it adequately but he assumed that the partition scheme was cut and dried; he was,
^kcrefore, thinking exclusively of his own interests : hence the reserves about
Aqaba and Maan which are referred to in the Palestine section of this report.
He expressed great concern about the Italians. He referred slightingly of
M. Mussolini as the “ Sword of Islam,” but spoke with apprehension about his
disposition to interefere in the affairs of other countries—mow Abyssinia, now
Spain oi the Red Sea. He had heard that the Italians had landed men on Hanish
Island and its neighbour. He spoke of his reluctance to purchase arms from the
Italians, as they would want something in return. To elicit further views on this
point Sir R. Bullard asked whether the King thought that His Majesty’s Govern
ment would want something in return for the arms which they were about to
supply at low prices. No, said Ibn Saud; the interests of Saudi Arabia and Great
Britain were identical. And would not the Italians allege that their interests
were identical with his ? Ibn Saud indicated that he did not care what the Italians
alleged. When all was said, he declared, the British were the best people. They
weie better than the Italians, better than the Turks—better than the Arabs.
He would even have preferred, from the purely Saudi point of view, that His
Majesty s Government should retain the mandate over Iraq. With the British
as his neighbours he felt safe. As an Arab and a Moslem he must sympathise
with the advance towards Arab independence, but the independence of Iraq had
created a situation which he viewed with grave anxiety. And now the British
were going to give up their responsibility for Transjordan !
. l n the last interview which His Majesty’s Minister had with Ibn Saud
m jt 7 18th ■ December )> afte r speaking about several matters—the Italians
and the Yemen, aviation, the Italian offer of arms, and Iraq—which are dealt with
elsewhere, the King raised once more the question of Palestine. The minor cause
of his anxiety, viz., the fear lest some other Arab State or individual should steal
a march on him, is recorded in paragraph 92.
. i 9^- question of Palestine was obviously still a major anxiety
with the King, because, as he said, his own position, being dependent upon that
oi His Majesty s Government, was weakened by the peril in which His Majesty’s
Government stood by reason of the Zionist policy. If only some policy could'be
found which would not place His Majesty’s Government in opposition to the
b n L .P e y a ! estln ® problem seems quite simple to Ibn Saud, and Sir R.
Bullard thought it well to ask whether His Majesty had not found, as he rose
from being ruler of ftejd to his present high position, that at every stage the
points of contact with the world increased and political questions became” more
complicated and whether he could not believe that the affairs of Great Britain,
coming as she did into touch with many countries which did not concern Saudi
Arabia seriously and haying possessions all over the world, were even more
complicated than His Majesty’s. The King pondered a moment as though the