مجموعة ٦/ ١٩ "الجزيرة العربية: (المملكة العربية السعودية) التقرير السنوي لمملكة الحجاز ونجد." [ظ‎‎٥‎٨] (٥٤٠/١١٧)

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Cox. Nothing whatever had come of these “ guarantees,” though he had been
promised “ all sorts of things.” He had assisted the Arab policy of His Majesty’s
Government by communicating to them the written and oral offers which he
received from the Turks as an inducement to him to join them against Hussein—
offers which he refused, alleging that he could not move against the British because
they were his neighbours on the Gulf, and saying that, in any case, he could not
join the Turks when they were slaughtering Arabs. At first he even told His
Majesty’s Government that he would accept Hussein as King of the Arabs, but
later he was obliged to withdraw his offer. He told Hussein that the resources
in money and arms which were supplied by the British were being wasted through
being dealt out to the various sheikhs according to the number of followers they
said they had, and asked that, if he sent his son and some men to help, they should
only be given arms for themselves and food to eat, and Hussein replied that Ibn
Baud must be either mad or drunk. Ibn Baud thereupon informed His Majesty’s
Government that he must lay down two conditions : that he would not recognise
Hussein as King of the Arabs, though he did not object to his being King of the
Hejaz, and that when the war was over His Majesty’s Government should allow
him to settle his own scores with Hussein. He had always listened to the advice of
His Majesty’s Government, even to his own hurt. On more than one occasion he
had fallen out with his chief supporters, the Ikhwan, for that reason, e.g., when
he retook Turaba, which the Shereefians had unjustly occupied, and His Majesty’s
Government asked him not to go any further; when he refrained, at the request of
His Majesty’s Government, from taking Aqaba, where the ex-King Hussein was
staying, and Maan; and when he listened to the mediation of the British agent at
Jedda and ensured the peaceful occupation of the city to the disappointment of
some of his followers. For all this loyal support, and after all the promises made
to him, what had he got ? Nothing whatever. On the contrary!
82. Ibn Baud said he would put his complaints under three heads :—
(a) His Majesty’s Government had not given him the help he needed.
(b) Their boundary policy was always hemming him in.
(c) By their Gulf policy they tried to make him dependent commercially on
Koweit and Bahrein.
Whereas a friend in need of help looked to a more powerful friend to assist
him, he had had no help from His Majesty's Government. Look what His
Majesty’s Government had done for Egypt and Iraq! Those countries might be
richer than Saudi Arabia, but Saudi Arabia could, in his opinion, be more useful
than either to His Majesty’s Government.
83. After expressing great interest in the valuable historical survey which
the King had given, but pointing out that what we had to adopt as a basis was the
facts of to-day, Mr. Rendel suggested that one difficulty was that, whereas
countries like Egypt and Iraq, which contained rich natural resources, could be
developed by commercial enterprises which would earn their own profits, Saudi
Arabia did not at present appear to be economically in that category. If, however,
Ibn Baud had any particular kind of help in mind and would specify what it was,
he could be sure that the suggestion would be considered very carefully. Ibn Baud
said that there were all sorts of help that he might mention, but he would speak
first of aviation, to which he attached great importance. He had sent to His
Majesty’s Minister a suggestion about the training of Saudis in aviation in Great
Biitain. As to the Italians, he swore that when the Italian aeroplanes arrived
he had wished that Allah would destroy the machines and the men in them. Mr.
Rendel reminded the King that the failure of other countries to follow our
example in reducing armaments had compelled us to rearm, and that the expansion
of the British air force was employing to the full our resources for the manu
facture of aeroplanes and the training of men as pilots and mechanics, and that,
while this should tend to deter other nations from disturbing the peace of the
world and should, therefore, be of advantage to His Majesty, it made it more
difficult than it would otherwise have been to give His Majesty direct assistance
m matters of aviation. Nevertheless, if His Majesty' would make specific
suggestions, they would be examined most carefully and sympathetically.
84- At a later meeting Mr. Rendel spoke of the necessity for co-ordination
or skilled men with suitable machines if time and money spent on training and
equipment were not to be wasted, and of the possibility that Saudi Arabia.