مجموعة ٦/ ١٩ "الجزيرة العربية: (المملكة العربية السعودية) التقرير السنوي لمملكة الحجاز ونجد." [ظ‎‎٢‎٧] (٥٤٠/٥٥)

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Hadhrami names and send them to the Governor of Aden, but until the co-opera
tion of the Saudi authorities can be secured, to keep track of all such cases s
impossible, and it is probable that many Hadhramis who have lived liere ioi
years with Saudi papers regard the fact as of no importance and consider them
selves as Hadhramis when outside the borders of Saudi Arabia.
Muscat and Oman.
99. Nothing to report.
Tracial Sheikhs and Qatar.
100. The feeling of contempt which the Sand family feel for the ruling
family of Qatar (paragraph 59 of 1937) was expressed to His Majesty’s Minister
bv the Amir Saud more politely when he praised the Sheikh of Bahrein as being
different from the smaller Gulf sheikhs, who were rather Boeotian.
There is little to record under this heading this year. The negotiations
about the eastern frontier of Saudi Arabia, which are dealt with elsewhere, affect
Ibn Sand’s neighbours, but the neighbours take no direct part in them. In a
conversation with His Majesty’s Minister late in the year Ibn Saud showed that
he took a lively interest in the Zubara question (paragraph 56 of 1937), and he
appeared to side with the Sheikh of Bahrein on this issue.
Bahrein.
101. The return visit of the Sheikh of Bahrein (paragraph 61 of 1937),
which was combined with the pilgrimage, was a complete success. From the
moment when he arrived in H.M.S. Londonderry, which had brought him from
Aden, the sheikh was treated with friendliness and respect by all Saudis from
the King down. It had been proposed that he should return to Bahrein across
Arabia, but in the end he travelled to Bombay in the first—-and the best—of the
returning pilgrim ships. Apparently Ibn Saud found it difficult to provide land
transport for the sheikh and his party at a time when he had to prepare for the
journey of Her Royal Highness Princess Alice and Lord Athlone from Jedda
to the Gulf, and the attention of the sheikh was gently diverted to the sea route.
Among the presents which the sheikh took away with him were eleven motor
cars, and forty rifles and 4,000 rounds of ammunition.
102. The Amir Saud, when speaking to His Majesty's Minister about the
visit soon afterwards, spoke of the sheikh with high appreciation. The visit was
also the subject of a flowery article in the Umm-al-Qura, in which the phrase
“ Moslem friendship and Arab brotherhood ” appeared about five times.
103. In November Ibn Saud spoke to His Majesty’s Minister with sympathy
of the Sheikh of Bahrein, whose administration had recently been the object of
violent demonstrations which the King attributed to Persian intrigues. He
evinced feelings of solidarity with the Sheikhs of Bahrein and Koweit, and it
was evident that he was thinking not only of the traditional bonds between them,
but of the common interest of important Arab rulers in preserving their position
against democratic interference other than the obligation which rests upon a
Moslem ruler to ask the views of such people as he thinks fit to consult.
104. Ibn Saud’s personal liking for the Sheikh of Bahrein, with whom he
appears to side in the Zubara dispute, does not prevent his wishing to escape
from dependence upon Bahrein as a port of transit for imports into Saudi Arabia
—a galling arrangement which hurts both his pocket and his pride. Towards the
end of the year his hopes began to be fulfilled when Ras Tanura was inaugurated
as a port of call for steamers which formerly could only land at Bahrein any
cargo consigned to Saudi Arabia.
105. In October the Saudi Government protested against the placing of a
mark by the Bahrein Government on an island which they claimed to be Saudi
territory. They gave the name of the island as Libaina. The island is probably
one of two islands both of which are considered by the Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf to be Bahrein territory. No reply had, however, been sent to the
Saudi Government by the end of the year.
*