مجموعة ٦/ ١٩ "الجزيرة العربية: (المملكة العربية السعودية) التقرير السنوي لمملكة الحجاز ونجد." [ظ‎‎٢‎٣] (٥٤٠/٤٧)

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nearly. It would not be difficult to safeguard the rights of His Majesty s Govern
ment in Palestine. If the Palestine Arabs made difficulties on that point ic
would see about it. It was he who was the leader of the Arab people, no
certain people who put themselves forward (a hit at Taufiq buaidi).
66. When transmitting the above account of Ibn baud s views, Sir P. Bullard
said that he felt that, so far as Ibn Saud went, it was our last chance. I wo
commissions had kept Ibn Saud in play for two years and he had reiused o
take part openly against us, on the ground that we should do justice to the
Arabs in the long run. Justice to Ibn Saud meant above all the stoppage ot
Jewish immigration. If after the London discussions immigration was com
tinued against the desire of the Palestine Arabs, he feared that Ibn Saud would
conclude that His Majesty’s Government were after all hostile to the Arabs,
and this would be a great personal humiliation to him and a triumph for the
Arab extremists who had laughed at him for putting his trust in His Majesty s
Government. The main inducement the partition scheme had offered the Arabs
was that it put a limit to Jewish encroachment, and it seemed to Sir R. Bullard
that, partition being ruled out, the line ought to be drawn at the very high
mark which Jewish immigration had already reached. Otherwise it was difficult
to see what could keep the Arabs favourable or even neutral to us if, for example,
in the course of a general conflict, Germany should offer, if successful, not only
to cancel the Balfour Declaration, but to eject from Palestine all the Jews who
had gone there since 1918. German propaganda about Palestine was bound to
damage us severely in the Arab east, where our sympathy with the German
Jews would generally be regarded either as hypocrisy or as a proof that as between
Arabs and Jews we were grossly partial. Now was the easiest moment to give
way on the immigration question, with the reports of the two commissions as
material. If we did not do so it was to be feared that the armed struggle
would continue, and if Ibn Saud then showed his sympathy openly with the
“rebels” we could hardly blame him.
67. In reply His Majesty’s Government defined their attitude on the
question of immigration. They did not intend to commit themselves before
hand, but to listen sympathetically to the Arab case in the hope of arriving
at a decision in consultation with them. They appreciated Ibn Sand’s position
and never contemplated his even acquiescing in the continuance of immigration
unless the Arabs did so too. But they were not convinced that immigration
should be entirely stopped. It was evident that if the London discussions were
to succeed concessions would have to be made on both sides, and it might be
found that the Arabs would accept some level of Jewish immigration as part
of a scheme giving them guarantees against Jewish domination. His Majesty’s
Government asked whether it was necessary to reply to Ibn Saud on this point,
but His Majesty’s Minister agreed with them that this was unnecessary.
68. It would be both wearisome and useless to trace in detail the course of
the negotiations preliminary to the London discussions. They were complicated
by physical distance and the time taken for communication between the five
centres concerned—London, Cairo, Bagdad, Riyadh and Syria—and by the desire
of Ibn Saud, the Egyptian Prime Minister, and the Foreign Minister of Iraq,
Taufiq Suaidi, not to allow any of the others to take precedence of him. It was
not until late in December that Llis Majesty’s Government were able to announce
the acceptance by the Governments of Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia of the
invitation to the London discussions, and the representatives of the Palestine
Arabs still remained to be elected when the year came to an end.
69. Although it is clear that Ibn Saud does not trust the Mufti, and that
from the beginning he urged moderation on him and his followers, he eventually
put forward for the consideration of His Majesty’s Government a list of five
candidates who were all extremists, viz., Jamil-al-Husaini, Izzat Darwaza, Amin
Tamimi, Hilmi Pasha and Alfred Rock. To this proposal His Majesty’s Minister,
under instructions from His Majesty’s Government, sent a long reasoned reply,
partly official and partly personal, saying that His Majesty’s Government were
prepared to accept as representatives of the Palestine Arabs those persons who
might be named by Ibn Saud after careful consideration and consultation with
Arab opinion. They would accept any or all of the five already suggested,