مجموعة ٦/ ١٩ "الجزيرة العربية: (المملكة العربية السعودية) التقرير السنوي لمملكة الحجاز ونجد." [و‎‎٢‎٣] (٥٤٠/٤٦)

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present state, it was futile to discuss whether the Balfour Declaration was
justifiable or not; the point was, what w T as possible now? (His remarks implied
here that the continuance of Jewish immigration was impossible because it
would be fatal to His Majesty’s Government.) As with Czecho-Slovakia, some
^ sacrifice must be made to avoid a greater evil. It would be tragic if, in case of
a general conflict, the Arabs should be forced to join the enemies of Great
Britain. The Arabs did not trust Italy and Germany, but desperate men would
accept help from any quarter.
60. In the course of this interview Ibn Saud gave a very obscure hint that,
if His Majesty’s Government adopted a new policy requiring assistance and
called in someone else (i.e., the Amir Abdullah) rather than their loyal friend
and supporter Ibn Saud, he would feel aggrieved. Fortunately, the remark was
so vague that Sir R. Bullard was able to meet it for the moment by a repetition
of an assurance which His Majesty’s Government had sent not long before, that
His Majesty’s Government gave their confidence to no one in the Arab world more
than to His Majesty.
61. When reporting this interview to His Majesty’s Government,
Sir R. Bullard said that Ibn Saud had shown a very helpful attitude, but that
it would be useless to expect that his delegates would acquiesce in any scheme
involving further Jewish immigration. He added that Ibn Saud had quoted
phrases from the German broadcasts about the Palestine policy of His Majesty’s
Government, which were just beginning, and had implied that we must expect
worse to follow.
62. The Imam of the Yemen telegraphed to Ibn Saud when the statement
of policy was published and asked advice as to what he should do if invited to
send a representative to the London discussions. Later, he said that he was
inclined to await the decision of the Palestine Arabs, as they had always declined
to discuss the question with the Jews.
63. On the 17th November His Majesty’s Government telegraphed to
Sir R. Bullard the official invitation for Ibn Saud to send a representative to the
London discussions, asked who the delegate would be, and expressed the hope that
he would be their guest during his visit to London. They stated at the same time
that, while the exact procedure that would be followed could not be laid down
exactly, it should be made clear to Ibn Saud that the Saudi Government were
being invited to send a representative for discussion, in the first place, with His
Majesty’s Government, who would at the same time discuss with representatives
of the Jewish Agency. The message added, for the information of the minister,
that they felt that the prospect of success would be seriously endangered if an
attempt were made to start with anything like a round-table conference, though
it was hoped that the discussions might develop into that at a later stage.
64. Ibn Saud accepted the formal invitation, but asked that his acceptance
should not be made public until that of Egypt and Iraq could also be made
known. Lie said that he was disposed to appoint the Amir Faisal as his repre
sentative. Being asked by Fuad Bey as to the suitability of this appointment,
Sir R. Bullard did not attempt to discourage it, feeling that the only alternative
candidates were Fuad Bey and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, either of whom would be
less amenable than the Amir to any influence which the Foreign Office could
exercise through the Saudi Minister in London. Later, Ibn Saud confirmed the
choice of the Amir Faisal. At the end of December he instructed Fuad Bey to
go to London with the Amir. This was perhaps because of his decision to utilise
the chance offered by the presence of the Amir in England to bring up
all-important pending questions.
65. On leaving Riyadh for Jedda, Sir R. Bullard reported Ibn Saud as
having set forth his views thus : The King still held friendship with His
Majesty’s Government to be essential for him and for all Arabs in spite of
advances from “certain other Powers.” If he thought His Majesty’s Govern
ment were hostile to the Arabs or to Islam he would be the first to take arms
against them, but he did not. He believed that they were now going to give
the Arabs their rights—not, perhaps, everything the Arabs demanded, but very