مجموعة ٦/ ١٩ "الجزيرة العربية: (المملكة العربية السعودية) التقرير السنوي لمملكة الحجاز ونجد." [ظ‎‎١‎٧] (٥٤٠/٣٥)

bv a member of the legation stall who was present, and the kaimakam did not
pursue the subject or show T any suspicion, but His Majesty s Minister thought
it well to report the incident to the Foreign Oihce. I he standing instructions
from the Admiralty at that time were that escort vessels in the Red Sea should
pay occasional visits to these islands, which for this purpose should be treated
as of indeterminate ownership, no notification of an intended visit being given
either to the Egyptian or to the Saudi authorities. Captain Dowding had
intended to have a look at the two islands on his way to Akaba, but he agreed
with His Majesty’s Minister that it would be better to abandon the intention
in order to allow time for the matter to be reconsidered in the light of the
kaimakam’s statement, which coincided with the Foreign Office view of the legal
position, and of the Anglo-Italian Agreement. In his report to the Foreign
Office, Sir R. Bullard suggested that it might be possible to detect any unusual
activity on these islands from aircraft flying outside their territorial waters and
that we should be content with that form of observation and His Majesty’s ships
should not land anyone on either of the islands. In transmitting this suggestion
to the Admiralty the Foreign Office said that they felt that the Saudi Government
might take steps to occupy the islands, and on the whole they saw no grave
disadvantage in that, unless it should cause serious difficulties with other Powers,
and that now seemed unlikely. They pointed out that the Middle Eastern Agree
ment with Italy, if it should come into force, might alter the existing situation
to some extent, since to whomever the islands might belong, the agreement gave
a w r arning to all Pow r ers other than Saudi Arabia not to attempt to occupy them.
In the end it was agreed that visits of His Majesty’s ships to the islands should
be discontinued, but observation should continue to be kept by aircraft as had
been done hitherto. That was the state of affairs in October, when, on account
of information received by the Palestine authorities about the running of arms
from Egypt to Akaba, H.M.S. Weston was instructed to watch the Gulf of
Akaba. The commanding officer made a hurried call at Jedda in order to explain
to His Majesty’s Minister that the efficacy of his task depended largely on his
being allowed to anchor occasionally in territorial waters off Tiran or Senafir,
which commanded the entrance to the Gulf of Akaba. Sir R. Bullard recom
mended to the Foreign Office that the request should be granted, the commanding
officer undertaking to use the privilege as sparingly as possible. He felt that
if the presence of the ship attracted the attention of the Saudi authorities, which
was not certain, we could plead the indeterminate status of the islands and the
fact that in the past His Majesty’s ships had anchored there frequently and even
landed on the islands, which are completely deserted. On the 18th October the
escort vessels in the Red Sea received instructions from the Admiralty relaxing
the orders about Tiran and Senafir for the purpose of the special arms patrol
and permitting them to visit and anchor in the territorial waters of those islands.
The instructions pointed out the importance of not reopening the question of
sovereignty, and said that the islands should not be visited more than was
necessary for operational reasons, and that no observation posts or ships’ boats
should be left. It is assumed that these orders were acted upon, but if they were
they would seem to have attracted no attention from the Saudi authorities.
14. In December the legation received a note from the Minister for Foreign
Affairs alleging that four aeroplanes believed to be British had been seen going
north over Saudi territory in the neighbourhood of Qatif in Hasa. This
information was sent to His Majesty’s Embassy at Bagdad, but there had been
no time for a reply to be received by the end of the year.
15. The claim laid by the Saudi Government to an island, called by them
Libaina, on which the Government of Bahrein had erected a mark, is dealt with
in paragraph 105.
Foreign Propaganda.
16. Ibn Sand is probably quite sincere when he says that he objects to the
use of the Moslem Holy Land as a basis for foreign propaganda, though his
objection may be political rather than religious. There is some evidence that
quantities of the anti-British propaganda about Palestine (including a consign
ment of gramophone records) which was sent down from Syria for distribution
during the pilgrimage were seized and detained, though a good deal of it was
in fact distributed both in Mecca and in Jedda. One result of the extravagant