"لجنة بلاد الرافدين. تقرير اللجنة المُعينة بموجب قانون البرلمان للتحقيق في عمليات الحرب في بلاد الرافدين، بالإضافة إلى تقرير خاص أعده القائد ج. ويدجوود، الحاصل على وسام الخدمة المتميزة، وعضو البرلمان، وملاحق. لندن: مكتب الأدوات القرطاسية الملكية، ١٩١٧." [ظ‎‎٧‎٤] (٢٤٨/١٤٨)

146
be put together in the Shatt-eJ-Arab, for apart from the
delays which this would have entailed, the workshop
resources of Mesopotamia were not, at this time, suffi
ciently developed to allow’ of this alternative. We
mention this as many of those who complain about the
delays which have taken place in sending out river craft
forget that for six months of the year vessels of this type
cannot be sent to sea. Indeed their despatch is always
attended with considerable risks, as is proved by the
fact that 3 paddlers, 5 tugs, 17 stern wheelers, 22 barges,
2 flats, and 1 floating dock, or a total of 50 vessels all
told, have foundered between various Indian ports and
Basra in the course of the last 14 months.
80. On July 8th, 10th and 17th, when the operations
against Nasariyeh were in progress, and the navigation
of the Hammar Lake was causing extraordinary diffi
culties, Sir John Nixon asked India to arrange for the
construction of 6 paddlers, 3 sternwheelers, 8 tugs, and
43 barges, and at the same time laid down a very definite
specification for each class of vessel. This request was
complied with, and on August 3rd the Secretary of State
for India was asked to place the order with shipbuilding
firms at home. It was not considered advisable to order
the construction of these vessels in India, as difficulties
and delays connected with the importation of materials
and machinery from England, owing to scarcity of freights,
made it unlikely that locally built vessels would be
completed as rapidly as those ordered from home.
81. A memorandum, prepared by Major-General Kem-
ball, in which Sir John Nixon’s requirements in shipping
were very clearly explained, was forwarded to India
about this time, i.e., August, 1915. After stating that
his principal need was light-draught steamers and the
personnel and material requisite for their maintenance,
he added the significant warning that “ if steps are not
taken in good time to meet these requirements we shall
run the risk of a breakdown at possibly a serious moment.
At present we cannot make the most effective use of
the troops available owing to want of steamers, and in
any crisis insufficiency of river transport would limit
the scope of reinforcements.”
82. Early in October—that is, just after the battle of
Kut-el-Amara—Sir John Nixon asked that some powerful
light-draught tugs or sternwheelers might be purchased
in India with the least possible delay, for use as stop
gaps pending the arrival from England of the additional
river craft ordered through the Secretary of State. He
explained that the maximum draught should be 3 feet
5 inches for tugs and 2 feet 6 inches for sternwheelers.
The Director of the Royal Indian Marine replied that
tugs of this type w'ere unobtainable. Sternwheelers of
the kind required could be secured, but it was virtually
impracticable to tow them from Rangoon to the Persian
Gulf, as owing to their fragile construction they would
break up in the slightest sea. The correctness of this
statement is proved by the fact that out of 24 sternwheelers
sent from time to time only 7 reached their destination.
On October 24th General Nixon reported that the Tigris
was rising and suggested that more Irrawaddy paddlers
might be purchased—that is, steamers drawing 4 feet
6 inches—the very class of vessel to which he had pre
viously objected. A great point was made by the autho
rities in Lidia of the apparent inconsistency of this demand,
but we do not consider that the criticism was of any
great weight, as vessels which draw too much water in
the shallow’ season might obviously be useful when the
river was in flood and so might help to mitigate a shortage
which threatened to become acute. At Sir John Nixon’s
request the Director, Royal Indian Marine, then furnished
him with a list of all the river craft in India or Burma
which, though differing widely from the specifications
he had laid down, approximated to his revised require
ments. As soon as he had made his selection of the craft
available, steps were taken to requisition the vessels
demanded, and towards the end of January they began
to arrive at Basra. They have since been supplemented
by steamers from England and Egypt, and by the
beginning of May the total number of steamers at the
disposal of the General Officer Commanding in Mesopo
tamia was 44, exclusive of 24 steamers, 52 tugs and
3 stemwheelers either en route from, or under construction
in, England or India.
83. Apart from the provision of additional river craft,
the introduction of better methods of control and adminis
tration on the lines of communication and at the base
has recently improved the situation, and when the
steamers under construction or ordered become available,
there should be no recurrence of the serious shortage
of shipping which existed between July, 1915, and
April, 1916. The working margin is, however, still
somewhat fine, as the number of steamers withdrawn
from work for repairs tends to increase, owing to the
excessive strain imposed on them during the past year.
Having regard to the uncertainties of navigation on
the Tigris and Euphrates, we consider that the position
as regards transport will not be really satisfactory until
a channel has been dredged across the Hammar Lake,
and until the railways about to be constructed to Nasariyeh
and Amara become available for the conveyance of the
sick and wounded as well as of troops and stores.
84. We find that there has been some misunderstanding
between the General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia
and the authorities in India on the subject of river
transport. The local authorities were, in our opinion,
unreasonable in their demands for steamers of a type
which is special to the Tigris, and they hampered the
action of the authorities in India by failing to state that
the specifications to which they adhered with such
insistence applied only to river craft which had to be
built, and not to vessels obtainable by purchase. Furt her,
had the General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia
explained that his objection to vessels drawing 4 feet
6 inches applied only to the low water season, and had
he intimated earlier that he was prepared to accept
steamers of good towing capacity with a maximum
draught of 6 feet, a large number of vessels might have
been sent to Basra during the fair w;eather season. It
was the limitation as to draught, combined with the
condition that they should be able to tow two large
barges, that prevented the earlier offer, by the Royal
Indian Marine, of many of the vessels w’hich Sir John
Nixon subsequently accepted.
85. On the other hand, the authorities in India appear
to us to have been somewhat lacking in foresight. They
must have been aware that the advance to Kut-el-Amara,
with the possibility of an advance on Bagdad and the
despatch of reinforcements from oversea, would be likely
to create a demand for additional shipping. They must
have realised that the river craft which had barely
sufficed for two divisions would not suffice for four,
especially with a line of communications some 150 miles
longer than before. They must also have known that
the steamers ordered from England were not likely to
arrive in time to be of use in the contemplated advance,
and that local resources would have, therefore, to be
supplemented from India or Burma. They seem, how
ever, to have done little to anticipate these difficulties,
contenting themselves with trying to meet demands as
they arose. The monsoon months, which might have
been utilised in selecting river steamers, bringing them
down to Calcutta and Rangoon and preparing them for
the sea voyage to Basra as soon as the fair weather
season set in, were allowed to slip by, little being done
until Sir John Nixon made a number of fresh demands.
86. We have examined this question of river steamers
in some detail, as we are required by our terms of reference
to consider whether the amount of river transport allotted
to the medical services was sufficient “ with regard to
the total amount available and the paramount military
requirements for transportation of troops, supplies and
ammunition.” As we have already explained, the
shortage of river transport on the Tigris has always been
so great that prior to the arrival of the “ Sikkim ” and
the “ Coromandel ” it was found impossible to make
any permanent separate allotment of shipping for hos
pital purposes. The question of the sufficiency of the
transport provided for the conveyance of the sick and
wounded thus merges into the larger question of the
transport available for the general purposes of the force,
and this, as we have pointed out, was found to be inade
quate so far back as when the troops moved from the
vicinity of Basra. In support of this contention we
cannot do better than quote the opinions of two dis
tinguished commanders. Writing on January 12th,
1916, immediately after the battle of Shaikh Saad,
Sir John Nixon remarked that “ the wounded with
Aylmer have been called upon to suffer unnecessarily
owing to shortage of river transport. Not only is it