"لجنة بلاد الرافدين. تقرير اللجنة المُعينة بموجب قانون البرلمان للتحقيق في عمليات الحرب في بلاد الرافدين، بالإضافة إلى تقرير خاص أعده القائد ج. ويدجوود، الحاصل على وسام الخدمة المتميزة، وعضو البرلمان، وملاحق. لندن: مكتب الأدوات القرطاسية الملكية، ١٩١٧." [ظ‎‎٦‎٨] (٢٤٨/١٣٦)

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latter two members of the Commission returned to
Basra on May 9th, visiting the hospital at Kurna en
route. On May 13th Mr. Ridsdale rejoined the Com
mission, and after a short stay at Basra, in order to
collect certain statistical information, we proceeded to
Bombay, where we arrived on May 22nd. On May 26th
we left for Simla, where we completed our investigations.
In order to secure the fullest possible information on the
points referred to us for enquiry, we have not only
examined a large number of witnesses orally, but have
endeavoured by personal inspection and enquiry to
ascertain the actual state of affairs and to see for our
selves how far the medical arrangements now work
satisfactorily. We have visited numerous hospitals and
discussed various points with administrative and executive
officers. Two of the Commissioners have personally
witnessed the evacuation of the wounded from the
battlefield, and scrutinised the arrangements made for
their reception and accommodation at dressing stations,
collecting stations and field ambulances, and all have
travelled with convoys of sick and wounded down the
Tigris. Further, we have invited many persons, in a
position to give evidence of value, to submit written
statements of their experiences and opinions, and by
the courtesy of Lieut.-General Sir Percy Lake a notice
was published in Force Orders inviting anyone who so
desired to furnish a statement to the Commission. The
266 statements recorded in the appendix represent the
results of our labours.
4. In spite of these efforts, however, we feel that we
have laboured under great disadvantage in our enquiry,
particularly in respect of the extended scope of our
investigation. In the first place, many officers whose
testimony would have been of great value—notably
Major-General Townshend, Colonel Hehir, I.M.S., Assistant
Director of Medical Services, and other officers of the
Sixth Division—were, when the enquiry was being made,
either besieged in Kut or prisoners of war. We are
therefore at an obvious disadvantage in having to criticise
their administration without affording them an oppor
tunity of putting forward their views. Many officers
intimately connected with particular phases of the
campaign had left Mesopotamia before the Commission
was appointed, and, being separated from official records,
have not been able to give detailed information on
particular points to the Commission. In the case of
many other important witnesses we have had to be
content with written statements, although it is probable
that by personal examination detailed information, on
various points not referred to in these statements, could
have been elicited. Finally, many of the witnesses
examined were officers who, when the Commission was
conducting its enquiry, were so overwhelmed with current
official work that it was impossible for them to collect
and furnish detailed statistical information on particular
points without real detriment to their public duties. It
was manifestly undesirable to ask them during the active
prosecution of the campaign to give up much of their
time to collect such information. We also much regret
that owing to Surgeon-General J. G. MacXeece having
left India on sick leave, before our return from Meso
potamia, we were unable to examine him.
5. Military synopsis .—As we are required to record
our opinions as to the sufficiency of the medical arrange
ments in Mesopotamia during each phase of the campaign
up to the fall of Kut-el-Amara, and as we are directed
to bear in mind throughout our proceedings the strategical
situation during this period, and the tactical obligations
arising therefrom, it seems desirable to preface our
criticisms by a short historical resume, so that the sequence
of events may be followed and due importance paid to
the military considerations involved. For facility of
reference a sketch map is added, showing the position
of places mentioned in the text.
The campaign in Mesopotamia up to the time of the
departure of the Commission may be divided into four
phases, viz. :—
I. The landing at Fao, the occupation of Basra and
Kurna, and the defeat at Shaiba or Barjasiyah
of the Turkish attempt to recapture Basra.
II. The expulsion of the Turks from Persian Arabistan
followed by the occupation of Amara on the
Tigris, and of Nasariyeh on the Euphrates.
[For convenience the later operations near
Xasariyeh have been included in this phase.]
HI. The capture of Kut-el-Amara, advance to
Ctesiphon, and subsequent retreat to Kut.
IV. The defence of Kut-el-Amhra and the unsuc
cessful attempts to relieve it.
PHASE I.
6. Landing at Fao. Battle of Sahil. Capt ure of Basra.
War was declared on Turkey on October 31st, 1914.
Meanwhile preparations had been made for the occupation
of Abadan and the protection of the Persian oil-fields
by the organisation of a small force under Brigadier-
General W. S. Delamain, for service at the head of the
Persian Gulf. This force, consisting of the 16th Infantry
Brigade with two Indian mountain batteries, was sent
to the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab and directed to effect
a landing near Fao. This was carried out on November
6th practically without opposition. The main disem
barkation took place at Saniyah, opposite Abadan, on
November 10th, and on the 15th General Delamain
dispersed the Turkish advanced troops at vSaihan. On
November 16th Lieut.-General Sir Arthur Barrett, the
Commander of the 6th Division, who had landed with
the 17th Infantry Brigade two days before, defeated
the Turks at Sahil or Zain, inflicting heavy losses. As
the result of these operations Basra w r as occupied on
November 23rd, its garrison having meanwhile retired
to Kurna. Our casualties in these successful engage
ments amounted to about 800, of w'hich some 500 occurred
at Sahil.
Occupation of Kurna .—By the end of November the
18th Infantry Brigade and the remainder of the divisional
troops had arrived at Basra, thus completing the con
centration of the 6th Division which constituted the
Expeditionary Force. Preparations were at once made
for an advance on Kurna, 40 miles up the Tigris, which,
being at the junction of the Tigris with the Euphrates,
is a place of considerable strategic importance. Kurna
was captured on December 8th by a force under Major-
General C. I. Fry, with the assistance of a naval flotilla.
Our losses amounted to 27 killed and 192 wounded.
The Turkish Commander, Subhi Bey, late Vali of Basra,
surrendered with most of the garrison. The Turks then
established themselves near Rotah, six miles above
Kurna, with a view to opposing any further advance.
7 Operations round Ahwaz .—At this time the I urkish
forces were disposed in three areas, viz., on the Euphrates,
on the Tigris, and on the Karun. A jehad was preached
in Arabistan early in 1915, and a great gathering of
Arabs, supported by eight battalions of Turkish regulars
with some guns, invaded Persian territory and cut the
pipe line leading from the oil-fields on the Karun to
Abadan. A couple of Indian battalions with guns were
despatched from Basra under Brigadier-General Robinson
to protect Ahwaz and support the Sheikh of Mohammerah,
whose tribesmen were giving trouble. On March 3rd
this small force moved out a few miles to meet the enemy,
who was encountered in greatly superior numbers. A
retirement to Ahwaz was ordered, and our troops, being
closely pressed by swarms of hostile Arabs, suffered
somewhat severely. In consequence of this reverse, the
12th Infantry Brigade under Major-General K. S. Davison
was sent to Ahwaz a few days later with orders to hold
the place and keep the enemy in check until a sufficient
force could be spared to expel the Turk and their Arab
auxiliaries from Persian Arabistan.
8. Meanwhile it became evident that operations would
have to be undertaken on the Euphrates, as well as on
the Karun and the Tigris, necessitating the employment
of a larger force. It was accordingly decided to reinforce
the 6th Division by the 6th Cavalry Brigade and the
12th Division, the latter consisting of the 12th, 30th
and 33rd Infantry Brigades, together with a Heavy
Artillery Brigade and various special units. The force
in Mesopotamia was then organized as an Army Corps,
the command of which was given to General Sir John
Nixon.
9. General Nixon landed at Basra with the Army
Corps Staff on April 9th, 1915, and took over command
of the force from Lieut.-General Sir Arthur Barrett, who
then proceeded to India on sick leave. Certain other
changes were made about this time. The command of
the 6th Division was given to Major-General C. V. F.
Townshend, and that of the 12th Division to Major-