"لجنة بلاد الرافدين. تقرير اللجنة المُعينة بموجب قانون البرلمان للتحقيق في عمليات الحرب في بلاد الرافدين، بالإضافة إلى تقرير خاص أعده القائد ج. ويدجوود، الحاصل على وسام الخدمة المتميزة، وعضو البرلمان، وملاحق. لندن: مكتب الأدوات القرطاسية الملكية، ١٩١٧." [و‎‎٦‎٠] (٢٤٨/١١٩)

PART XII.—FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
117
B. Recommendations.
the forces under him. We hope that amongst these changes there will be an amalgamation
into one department of the two existing departments of the Commander-in-Chief and the
Military Member of Council with a single and central registry, and that special efforts will
be made to diminish the amount of minute-writing and to simplify the present elaborate
system of clerical checking and counter-checking.
30. It is also clear that, so long as Simla remains the Headquarters of the Army
Departments, it is essential that in the event of oversea expeditions, there should be estab
lished at the port of embarkation representatives of the Army Departments with wide
power to act without reference back to Headquarters.
Necessity for Enquiring into Certain Military Questions.
31. We have heard some evidence to the effect that the Indian Army has lost its
old popularity, and that it is no longer regarded as a satisfactory service from a professional
point of view, and that officers anxious for advancement prefer serving at home on account
of the better methods of instruction and training which the Home Army now affords.
It may be that some such ideas have deterred senior officers from accepting employment
in India ; but we understand that the candidates for commissions in the Indian Army
at the present moment show no falling off either in numbers or quality. There was
undoubtedly a grievance as to the conditions of promotion in the Indian Army compared
with those prevailing in what used to be known as “ the King’s Army,” but this disparity
has to some extent been recently modified. In both armies promotion in the lower ranks
is practically by seniority (in the Indian Army with time limitations), and in the higher
grades by selection. It has further come to our notice that there is little personal contact
between the Secretariat Departments of the Indian Army and the combatant ranks, and
that in consequence there is not that sympathetic exchange of opinion and knowledge
between the administrative branches and the executive forces of the Army which is
essential to harmonious co-operation. There seems to be so much writing, that military
officials have inadequate time at their disposal for inspecting, training and testing the
troops, for whose efficiency and equipment they are responsible. These are evils which
can without much difficulty be corrected, if the Indian Government, profiting by experience,
will seriously take into consideration the defects in their military methods.
32. But other and more important considerations have been brought prominently to
our notice in the course of our enquiries. The dual system under which London and Simla
tried to conduct the campaign in Mesopotamia has obvious drawbacks. The chain of
responsibility is greatly lengthened by the number of authorities, who had necessarily to
be consulted, and who had a voice in the direction of affairs. We will enumerate the various
authorities who had to be consulted as regards the Mesopotamia Expedition : First, the
General Officer Commanding on the spot in Mesopotamia, then the Commander-in-Chief
in India, then the Viceroy, then the Secretary of State for India with his Military Secretary,
then the War Council with the Imperial Staff, and finally the Cabinet. Such a sub
division of authoritative control must weaken the sense of responsibility of each
authority consulted, and it certainly has made it very difficult accurately to apportion
blame or credit. It was under the dual system that the administrative failures took place
during 1915 and early in 1916 in Mesopotamia, and it was not until London took over the
sole charge that there was any marked improvement in the management of the campaign.
The improvement and success since effected are a striking illustration of the all-importance
of unity of control in time of war.
We should also like to call attention to the manner in which the army in India suffered
during the era of economy before the war, when the military estimates were ruthlessly
cut down, often, it is to be feared, without due consideration. The result was that the
army was inadequately equipped, not only for an oversea expedition, but even for frontier
requirements. We also gather that there is general dissatisfaction at the system of
microscopic financial control exercised over details of military expenditure, pay and
allowances. We give in an appendix* a few illustrations of how hardly this system opei atee
in individual cases.
Finally it has been admitted by practically all the witnesses examined upon the subject
that the principles, upon which the system of reserves for the native army of India had
been established had proved faulty and unreliable. The men were too old, and had
forgotten their training. It was also conceded that a new scheme on different principles
* See Appendix IV.