"لجنة بلاد الرافدين. تقرير اللجنة المُعينة بموجب قانون البرلمان للتحقيق في عمليات الحرب في بلاد الرافدين، بالإضافة إلى تقرير خاص أعده القائد ج. ويدجوود، الحاصل على وسام الخدمة المتميزة، وعضو البرلمان، وملاحق. لندن: مكتب الأدوات القرطاسية الملكية، ١٩١٧." [ظ‎‎٤‎٤] (٢٤٨/٨٨)

86
PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.
E. Responsibility of Secketary of State, Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief.
the evidence it contains, able to put pressure upon the Commander-in-Chief, and also upon Sir J. Nixon, who
keeps on reporting that everything is well. It is quite clear to me that all is not well, and I have urged the
Commander-in-Chief to send somebody to Mesopotamia to perform more or less the same duties as those which
you have explained to me had been carried out by Colonel Lee in Flanders.”
92. Sir Beauchamp Duff was asked by us—
“ In connection with another matter, you spoke of getting to hear that things were not going very well.
At what sort of period did you get to hear through what may be called private channels that the medical arrange
ments were breaking down ?—About the end of December, 1915, I think.”
In answer to further questions. Sir Beauchamp Duff modified this statement by denying
that he had heard anything in unofficial conversation. But he had seen a memorandum
by Major Carter before the battle of Ctesiphon, and had in consequence telegraphed to
Mesopotamia to enquire about the provision of hospital ships. Plans for this were indeed
being discussed. Moreover, at the Conference on December 23rd he had heard Surgeon-
General MacNeece’s account of the suffering of the wounded after Ctesiphon.
93. Nevertheless, when the Viceroy pressed him to have a full enquiry made, his letter
of December 30th, while assenting to the enquiry, shows in our judgment a very unfortunate
spirit. This letter was the more important, because the reassuring impression which it
conveyed was repeated by the Viceroy in a telegram to London. The letter of December
30th is as follows :—
“ I will certainly have the whole matter enquired into and reported on.”
“ I am quite sure that in India itself and between India and Basra everything is right. The flow of stores,
supplies, and comforts is regular and as complete as we can make it, any deficiencies that may exist being con
fined to articles for which we are dependent on England and the prompt supply of which we cannot always
ensure. As to what happens beyond Basra I am dependent on official reports. The private complaints
which Your Excellency mentions do not reach me. It is one of the drawbacks of military discipline that
1 officers will not mention such matters either to me or my Staff lest they should be looked on as" throwing blame
! on those under whom they have been serving directly. My official reports indicate nothing wrong except the
shortage of river transport which we are straining every nerve to supplement, and even that has only become
a burning question since “ D Force began to grow larger. I feel sure that everyone in Mesopotamia is doing
his best, but our very long river line is necessarily a great handicap, and we cannot reproduce there French
conditions which are due to good railways, good roads and abundance of motor transport.
4i But though I will leave no stone unturned to get at the actual facts, I would ask Your Excellency to
remember that ithe experience of previous campaigns shows that such complaints are very often exaggerated
by officers making general statements which are really based only on some particular incident. There are
also a good many cases where the fault lies with the complainant himself. For instance, Captain Bowring’s
complaint that on his voyage up the Tigris he and his companions were short of food is clearly one of these.
It was the business of these officers themselves to draw their rations for the voyage before they left Basra.
No Staff can dry-nurse officers who neglect such elementary duties.”
94. This attitude of incredulity about rumours and complaints Sir Beauchamp Duff
maintained and defended before the Commission. He was asked :—
“ The point I wish to put is that for a considerable time, perhaps six weeks or two months, you were in
possession of warnings—the Indian Government were, at any rate—-coming from home, and yet your attitude
was incredulous, although you had not made any very drastic inquiry into the matter ?—Our attitude wa»
somewhat incredulous, certainly.”
and being further pressed, he said :—
“ The reports come in. In every campaign I have seen in my life there are complaints. A large number
of complaints come in, many of which are extremely frivolous. When such reports are sent to you anony
mously and the names of the people who make the complaints are refused you attach little weight to them.
The moment I get a report with a name I pay strong attention to it. I find going into these anonymous reports
is simply a waste of time.”
He was further asked—
“ You would treat a letter from the Secretary of State or the Viceroy on that footing ? ”
and replied—
“ Unless the Secretary of State or the Viceroy should supply me with the name of the person who made
the complaint.”
95. We desire explicitly to dissent from the position thus taken up by Sir Beauchamp
Duff. It is, of course, perfectly true that a great many rumours are untrustworthy and a
great many complaints unreasonable ; and this untrustworthiness and unreasonableness
form a very good ground for refusing to take administrative action merely because of
s rumours and complaints. But rumours that may be an insufficient ground for action rnay
be a good ground for enquiry. They may be in themselves likely ; they may come from
several sources ; they may recur again and again ; or they may be brought to notice bv