"لجنة بلاد الرافدين. تقرير اللجنة المُعينة بموجب قانون البرلمان للتحقيق في عمليات الحرب في بلاد الرافدين، بالإضافة إلى تقرير خاص أعده القائد ج. ويدجوود، الحاصل على وسام الخدمة المتميزة، وعضو البرلمان، وملاحق. لندن: مكتب الأدوات القرطاسية الملكية، ١٩١٧." [و‎‎٤‎٢] (٢٤٨/٨٣)

PAKT X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.
81
i
D. The Misuse of Reticence.
of sedimentation which he said were being rectified so as to meet all requirements. Barely
a month later the Vincent-Bingley Commission were in the country and they report in
strong terms of the inadequacy of the measures taken for purifying the water and
the consequent danger to the troops. The evidence before us strengthens their criticisms
and shows that the defects in water supply caused considerable illness in the forces and
necessitated a large expenditure before it was remedied.
75. We are happy to be able to report that we can find no evidence that the want of
frankness in medical matters continued after the departure from Mesopotamia of Surgeon-
General Hathaway and General Nixon. We believe that Surgeon-General Treherne,
General Lake, General Aylmer, and the other responsible officers all freely disclosed to
Headquarters the medical defects and dangers with which they had to deal.
Resentment of Criticism.
76. It is also our duty to draw attention to another unpleasant feature in the Meso
potamian Campaign, viz., the active intolerance of all criticism of defects or suggestions
for reform. Colonel Hehir was especially asked by Sir William Babtie, D.M.S. in India,
to give Surgeon-General Hathaway the benefit of his experiences in the earlier phases of
the campaign. At the outset, Colonel Hehir accordingly made suggestions to Surgeon-
General Hathaway, but his action in this respect was so resented that he subsequently
desisted from making even representations, which it was his obvious duty to have made.
Major Carter who, as we have seen was the first to disclose the medical debacle after
Ctesiphon, endeavoured to bring to the notice of the authorities in Mesopotamia, the real
condition of the wounded. On this account he was treated with great rudeness. Surgeon-
General Hathaway, in writing to the D.M.S. in India on this subject says, “ The Army
Commander realising the injustice ordered the D.A. and Q.M.G. and myself to deal with
him (Major Carter), with reference to his objectionable remarks.” And General Cowper,
then D.A. and Q.M.G., told us “ I threatened to put him under arrest, and I said that I
would get his hospital ship taken away from him for a meddlesome interfering faddist.”
In another part of our Report* we refer to Sir Beauchamp Duff’s threat to dismiss
General Cowper for sending to India too insistent demands as to the need for River Trans
port. Such incidents as these indicate the atmosphere of repression of complaints which
permeated Indian officialdom, and do much to explain the unfortunate suppressions of
truth with which we have dealt in this section.
E. Responsibility of Secretary of State, Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief.
77. The main responsibility for the medical arrangements of the Mesopotamia Campaign
rests upon the Government of India and its officers. According to the division of function
which was laid down by the Home Government, it was only the policy of the expedition
which was to be decided in London ; the management of the expedition was to be in the
hands of the Government of India. We have commented elsewhere upon this division
of function. But since, whether wisely or unwisely, it was adopted, it would be plainly
unreasonable to criticise the India Office for the details of medical administration over
which they attempted to exercise no control. But one general responsibility does belong
to the India Office, or perhaps it would be more proper to say, to the Cabinet. Whatever
preparations were made in England for a European war before August, 1914, no prepara
tions were made in India. The Home Government and the Indian Government were
agreed that the greatest military requirements for which it was necessary to make provision
were those which might arise in defending the North-West Frontier, and maintaining the
internal security of India. This policy suggested by the Indian Government was approved
by Lord Crewe in a despatch dated March 20th, 1914. Overseas expeditions of a minor
character might be undertaken, and the Indian Army was to be mobilised so as to make
such a use of the Indian Army possible, but no additional expenditure was to be incurred
in anticipation of such expeditions. Accordingly, when the European War broke out in
August, 1914, it found the Indian Army organisation altogether unsuited for the purpose
of such expeditions as that to Mesopotamia.
The Indian Government was prepared only for a campaign on the North-West Frontier
against Afghanistan and the tribes, and to maintain internal security in India. On no
* See Part XL, para. 44.
(48—176)
L