"لجنة بلاد الرافدين. تقرير اللجنة المُعينة بموجب قانون البرلمان للتحقيق في عمليات الحرب في بلاد الرافدين، بالإضافة إلى تقرير خاص أعده القائد ج. ويدجوود، الحاصل على وسام الخدمة المتميزة، وعضو البرلمان، وملاحق. لندن: مكتب الأدوات القرطاسية الملكية، ١٩١٧." [ظ‎‎٣‎٦] (٢٤٨/٧٢)

70
PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.
B. Medical Administration of Colonel Hehir in Mesopotamia.
before us (after the event) Colonel Hehir says : “ The absence of special river transport
for sick and wounded was felt from the earliest stage of the campaign and this want
became progressively more pronounced as time went on.” Yet General Barrett, speaking of
the period of Colonel Hehir’s administration, stated to the Vincent-Bingley Commission :
" I was never asked by any of my medical officers to apply for any river hospital steamers.”
The fact was that Colonel Hehir was content to overcome the difficulty by securing from
the A.Q.M.G. (often only after much importunity) ordinary river boats for the transport of
the sick on special occasions. When the number of sick was small, as under Colonel Hehir’s
administration, this was a possible expedient and Colonel Hehir was able, he assures us, to
see that the boats were properly cleaned and sanitated before being used for patients. But
such a system was bound to fail when there came a large increase in the number of patients
and in the demands upon the steamers for ordinary transport purposes. And Colonel Hehir
points out that “ these steamers were always unsatisfactory ” and that (in Surgeon-General
Hathaway’s time) “ their absence became more felt as the number of sick and
wounded increased and at the battles of Kut and Ctesiphon we were in consequence
faced with difficulties which could not be overcome satisfactorily.”
37. Another defect, which was evident, though not accentuated, under Colonel Hehir’s
administration was the failure to supply the expedition with suitable vehicles for carrying
the wounded. The only land ambulance transport provided were stretchers and riding
mules. Stretchers are not suitable for distances beyond 2| miles, if for no other reason,
because of the strain on and consequent failure of the stretcher bearers. This is a vital
objection where, as in the Mesopotamian campaign there was often an actual shortage
of bearers. Mules are, of course, impossible for severely wounded cases, and at one of the
early engagements in the campaign (Rotah, January 20th, 1915) a R.A.M.C. officer informed
the Yincent-Bingley Commission : “ These animals were very restive and not suitable for
wounded men to ride upon ” with the consequence that the wounded, luckily very few in
number, had to be carried back between G and 7 miles on stretchers. There were no
motor vehicles available, except one or two provided from private sources. Consequently,
whenever it became necessary to carry the wounded any distance, resort was had to the
ordinary army transport cart (usually known as A.T. carts), which is thus described by
the A.D.M.S. of the 3rd Division :
“ The ambulance transport of these units consisted of the army transport cart, which is without springs ;
has no cover to give protection against rain or the direct rays of the sun ; and the bottom of which consists of
bars of iron which, even when liberally covered with mattresses or other padding, renders the placing of a
wounded man, especially cases of fracture, in such a conveyance, a practice which can only be designated &«
barbarous and cruel.”
38. Coffinel Hehir himself recognises that the use of A.T. carts for the wounded
” gives rise to a vast amount of suffering that would have been avoided by
the use of suitable vehicles with proper springs.” He did not, however, as
Principal Medical Officer, apply for any wheeled ambulance transport, because,
as he told us, he thought the fighting would continue to be on, or near one
of the rivers, and also because from February to June, the country was likely
to be flooded. Our comment on this defence is that battles near a river are, as was
seen at Es Sinn and Ctesiphon, likely to extend further from the river than the distance for
which wounded can be properly carried by stretcher. While, as regards the floods, it
would not have been too early to apply in January for a special form of wheeled transport
to be prepared for the time when the floods would subside in Julv. The fact was that in
the earlier fighting in the campaign the number of the wounded to be removed a long
distance was either very small as at Rotah, or else as at Shaiba the distance to be covered by
wheeled ambulances was not very great. Colonel Hehir was, therefore, able to cope with
the situation, either by using only stretchers, as at Rotah and Sahil, or by using padded
A.T. carts to supplement the stretchers as at Shaiba. Thus, when he was Principal
Medical Officer, we find him writing to the D.M.S. in India that the A.T. carts were
“ invaluable in transporting the wounded from the battlefield ” at Shaiba, while later on,
in his evidence before us, he frankly deplores having to use them (under the administration
of General Hathaway) at the battles of Es Sinn and Ctesiphon.
In these and other instances, we think that Cojpnel Hehir was to blame for failing to v'
requisition India for equipment, which, though not indispensable at the time, was certain
to be indispensable in the future. It was a mistake to risk disaster before tAlring
measures which ordinary foresight would have adopted long before.