"لجنة بلاد الرافدين. تقرير اللجنة المُعينة بموجب قانون البرلمان للتحقيق في عمليات الحرب في بلاد الرافدين، بالإضافة إلى تقرير خاص أعده القائد ج. ويدجوود، الحاصل على وسام الخدمة المتميزة، وعضو البرلمان، وملاحق. لندن: مكتب الأدوات القرطاسية الملكية، ١٩١٧." [و‎‎٣‎١] (٢٤٨/٦١)

PART rx.—TRANSPORT.
59
(C 48—176) H 2
B. Railways.
have decided not to proceed with the construction of the railway, on the ground of expense.”
Thus the Government of India’s decision on Sir J. Nixon’s application for a railway was
not given until nearly three months after they had received his despatch asking for an
early determination of the matter.
55. We have been unable to ascertain definitely the reason for this delay on the part
of the Indian Government in dealing with so important an application from the General
Officer Commanding the Mesopotamia Expedition. As the proposal involved considerable
expenditure it was submitted to the Finance Department of the Government of India,
but was not formally considered by Sir William Meyer, the Finance Member, until October
5th, when he forwarded to the Army Department the following note :—
“ 1. I confess to being somewhat sceptical as to the line being at all so remunerative as is at present
represented, at any rate for some time to come. Apart from this too, it is perfectly clear that, in present
financial circumstances, with which His Excellency the Army Member is acquainted, we cannot embark on
large expenditure on such a project for other than the most urgent military reasons. We have already had
to cut our coming railway programme in India to the quick, and may have to adopt other drastic measures
to make both ends meet. Further, we have at present no right to act as if we were certain of getting
Mesopotamia or a very considerable portion of it, after the war.
2. If, however, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and Army Member can definitely assure me
that this project is absolutely necessary for the safeguarding of our military position, having regard, inter
alia, to the time which the line must take to construct, I cannot, of course, resist a reference home on this
basis. (In regard to the time factor, it must be borne in mind that, although the Railway Board think that
the line might be built in from 6 to 8 months, we know from past experience that the best provisional estimates
of this character are liable to get considerably exceeded in practice.) In that event it will be necessary, as
Mr. Fell says, to indicate to the Secretary of State that the cost, as a military measure, must, under present
arrangements, fall on the Home Government.
3. We should not, of course, in the telegram say anything about the contingency which Mr. Fell
adumbrates, and which I think not at all improbable, of our having eventually to pay the full cost of the
Mesopotamia operations, or at any rate a very large part of it. But this contingency adds to the necessity
for caution in proposing expenditure which may ultimately fall upon India.
4. His Excellency the Viceroy should of course see before final action is taken.”
56. On receipt of this note the Commander-in-Chief discussed the question with
Sir Percy Lake, the Chief of the General Staff, who put forward a memorandum on
October 26th generally favourable to Sir John Nixon’s proposal, and in the last
paragraph of which he said—
It would be imprudent, to say the least of it, not to refer this proposal to the Secretary of State and
the Cabinet, upon whose decision would then depend the ultimate responsibility for our capacity to hold
Mesopotamia, a problem in which the security of Nasariyeh is an essential factor.
Sir Beauchamp Duff’s decision on this memorandum was conveyed in the following
note :—
“ Hia Excellency considers that when the occupation of Baghdad and the reinforcement of Sir J. Nixon’g
force has taken place the necessity for the immediate construction of a railway to Nasariyeh will have largely
lost its force.”
57. The full grounds upon which the Government of India rejected the proposal are
stated in a telegram from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, dated July 24th, 1916,
to have been as follows :—
Basrah-Nasariyeh Railway. —The proposal to construct this line was put forward by General Nixon
on military, political and commercial grounds. The large expenditure involved could not in our opinion
be justified on either political or commercial consideration. We had not acquired the status in Mesopotamia
which would justify such a charge upon Indian resources nor had we the right to act as if we were sure of
retaining Mesopotamia or a large portion of it after the war. We had to consider whether the project wa»
absolutely necessary for the safeguarding of our military position before we could recommend the construction
of the line as a definite war measure, the cost of which would fall on the Imperial Government. Having
regard to the facts that sanction had recently been accorded to the advance on Baghdad, which would, we
hoped, attain its objective, in which case the Basra-Nasariyeh line would cease to be essential from the military
point of view owing to our command of the Euphrates line, and after weighing the various considerations
we arrived at the conclusion that the necessity for the immediate construction of a railway to Nasiriyah had
to a great extent lost its force and that the advantages to be gained would not be commensurate with the
cost of its construction. We therefore decided not to recommend the proposal and informed you accordingly,
vide paragraph 3 of Lord Hardinge’s telegram of the 14th November last, No. H.-9125. The various considera
tions which influenced our decision were not, however, fully stated in that telegrams.
We do not ourselves feel called upon to criticise the military arguments in this
telegram, but we cannot help noting that when the War Office took control of the opera
tions, they pressed for and ultimately built this railway preliminarily to the second advance
on Baghdad.