"لجنة بلاد الرافدين. تقرير اللجنة المُعينة بموجب قانون البرلمان للتحقيق في عمليات الحرب في بلاد الرافدين، بالإضافة إلى تقرير خاص أعده القائد ج. ويدجوود، الحاصل على وسام الخدمة المتميزة، وعضو البرلمان، وملاحق. لندن: مكتب الأدوات القرطاسية الملكية، ١٩١٧." [ظ‎‎٢‎٥] (٢٤٨/٥٠)

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PAKT IX.—TRANSPORT.
A. Shortage of River Transport.
receive, and that an amount of transport inadequate to a smaller force and shorter line of
communication must be still more inadequate for a larger force and longer line of com
munication. We think the plea that steamers and barges had been asked for is not an
answer. It was known that what had been asked for could not be available for a long time,
and certainly not until long after the operations referred to had been carried out. Moreover,
Sir John Nixon was informed on the 28th October by his Inspector-General of Communi
cations that he estimated that in addition to the shipping already ordered, 12 more
steamers and 24 barges would be required in view of the expected reinforcements. This
estimate he did not apparently pass on to India or London. If he had done so, in view
of the insistence by both the Indian and Home Governments on the necessity for the
prompt arrival at Baghdad of the reinforcing two divisions, it is at least open to doubt
whether the sanction to the advance would not have been countermanded.
19. The responsibility for making the respective advances with insufficient transport
and for the military reverses, discomfort of the troops, and abnormal suffering of the sick
and wounded which resulted from such insufficiency, attaches primarily to General Nixon,
whose estimate of the military exigencies of the moment must, however, be taken into
account. At the same time we cannot exonerate the Commander-in-Chief and the General
Staff in India, wffio had a survey of the river in their possession, knowledge of the
difficulties of its navigation, a list of all the steamers available, knowledge that many of
them were of too deep a draught for the low season, and information as to the lengthening of
the communications and the reinforcements which were being sent In these circumstances
to authorise and even recommend to the Government in London the various advances
without satisfying themselves that the expedition was properly equipped with river
transport, and, indeed, actually with the knowledge that it was not, involves Sir Beau
champ Duff in a large measure of responsibility. While a copy of General Nixon’s
despatch of July 10 th, 1915, and of General Kemball’s memorandum was received by
the India Office and forwarded to the War Office in September, it was not laid before the
Secretary of State for India. Moreover it does not appear that General Nixon’s actual
shortage of river transport was brought by the Military Department of the India Office
before the various expert bodies subsequently consulted in such a way as to attract their
attention, and in consequence the War Council or Cabinet when they were asked to sanction
the advance on Baghdad were not cognisant of the risk. As these documents were attached
to a requisition for a large amount of liver transport the Military Branch of the India
Office sent them all on to the Stores Branch of that Department as an indent; and though
the memorandum was forwarded to the War Office, it was not accompanied by any letter
calling special attention to the revelation made as to the grave shortage of transport.
This blunder led to serious consequences, for which General Barrow cannot be exonerated
as the head of the Military Department at the India Office. We have shown elsewhere
that the advance on Baghdad was proposed and sanctioned on the understanding that
there would be large reinforcements for General Nixon’s forces, and such reinforcements
were of little immediate value if the River Transport to convey them from Basra to the
front was not available. It may well have been that had General Kemball’s significant
reminder of the correlation between reinforcements and transport been brought to the
notice of the War Council, the Baghdad adventure and its attendant misfortunes would
have been avoided.
Responsibility for Shortage of River Transport.
20. Important witnesses before us have differed widely as to the incidence of
responsibility for the supply of river transport for the Mesopotamia Expedition.
Sir Beauchamp Duff informed us that Sir J. Nixon in Mesopotamia rather than the
General Staff in India was responsible for calculating how much river-transport was
required. On the other hand Sir J. Nixon said, “ It was the duty of India to ask and find
out what was required for the forces, and not to impose the intolerable burden on me of
having continually to fight to obtain the necessary supplies, etc.,” and in support of this
contention he referred us to the Field Service Regulations.
21 . Under the Field Service Regulations the Commander-in-Chief in the
Field (in this case, Sir John Nixon) is “ relieved of direct responsibility for the conduct of 5
the business of providing the requirements of the forces in the field.” It is also laid down
that “ responsibility for the adoption, modification, or revision of plans of operations rests
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