"لجنة بلاد الرافدين. تقرير اللجنة المُعينة بموجب قانون البرلمان للتحقيق في عمليات الحرب في بلاد الرافدين، بالإضافة إلى تقرير خاص أعده القائد ج. ويدجوود، الحاصل على وسام الخدمة المتميزة، وعضو البرلمان، وملاحق. لندن: مكتب الأدوات القرطاسية الملكية، ١٩١٧." [ظ‎‎٢‎١] (٢٤٨/٤٢)

40 PART VIIL—ARMAMENT, EQUIPMENT, REINFORCEMENTS, ETC.
Drafts and Reinforcements.
the “ first reinforcements ” long before they were sent to Mesopotamia, this applying
equally to British and Indian troops, whilst with regard to those sent direct from India
to Mesopotamia, even those that mobilised with their full personnel were soon in need of
reinforcing drafts.
Drafts for British Troops.
13. Each British infantry unit ordered on service was supposed to have 25 per cent,
of its strength at its depot in India, and each Cavalry Regiment 33 per cent., to replace
wastage until drafts arrived from home. When these depots were exhausted, it devolved
upon the War Office to keep British Units in Mesopotamia up to strength, and each unit,
no doubt, had or should have had a depot or reserve battalion in England preparing
and training men to replace casualties. There were a few reservists in India, numbering
altogether 651, of whom 255 in private employ were called up in August. 1914, whilst the
remainder in Government and Railway employment were not called up till later, and then
only those employed by the railways, an effort which produced another 250 ; but no doubt
India looked, and we think rightly, to the War Office to keep the British units supplied
with suitable and sufficient drafts.
Sir Beauchamp Duff tells us, however, that not till October, 1915, a year after the first
landing, were any drafts sent to India or Mesopotamia by the War Office. On May 21 st,
1915, the War Office wires as follows to the Commander-in-Chief, India :—
Owing to great and increased losses which you, no doubt, know of, every available man is now required
to replace casualties ; consequently, though we will bear in mind your request, we cannot bind ourselves a*
to when we can meet your needs. This refers to your telegram of May, 1915, No. S. 10101.
No real blame can be attached to the War Office for this shortage of drafts. It arose
from the imperative necessity of replacing losses incurred in France and Gallipoli, but the
failure of the War Office to keep to the previous understanding did unquestionably embar
rass the Indian Military Authorities.
The effect of this inability to provide drafts is illustrated by General Townshend’s
statement, that on October 3rd, his English battalions were reduced to mere half battalions.
This description is perhaps not quite accurate, but Major Bastow speaking more precisely
has told us that at the battle of Ctesiphon the strength of the British Battalions were :—
Dorsets, 573 ; Norfolks, 520 ; and 1 st Oxfords, 619. The full strength of these battalions
should have been some 2,500, and they were therefore nearly 33 per cent, below
establishment in effectives at this important battle. What the state of these battalions
would have been had they not been supplied with drafts from Territorial Regiments in
India may be well imagined.
Drafts for Indian Troops.
14. The regulations applicable to Indian troops require men to serve 25 years for a
pension. Such a system means that there must be a large number of men in the ranks
who would be entirely unfit for the rigours of active service, and its effect is illus
trated by the fact that the Indian Government were requested to send to France no men
who had had more than fifteen years’ service. It was obvious beforehand, therefore, that
there would be need for abundant drafts to take the place of unfit men in any active
operations in which Indian troops ■were engaged.
But our evidence shows that the supply of drafts to Indian battalions at the commence
ment of the campaign from the Army reserve was a complete failure. Sir Beauchamp Duff
told us that this reserve for the Indian Army Units proved practically of no value. In
fact, we do not hesitate to say that the Indian reserve system entirely broke down under
the stress of war conditions. These reserves either as regards numbers, in all some 30,000,
or efficiency were quite unable to meet the calls made upon them to maintain the strength
of the Divisions sent to France; in fact it was only on the recall of these Divisions, and
consequent lowering of the numbers of casualties, that the authorities in India were in
any way able to overtake the wastage in Mesopotamia. After that, though a great strain
was felt during the efforts to relieve the garrison of Kut, when the casualties to Indian troops
amounted to very nearly 20 , 000 , the wastage was fairly well met with new recruits from
India. But we cannot believe that the steps taken to obtain recruits were very thorough.
For instance, recruiting officers, who in peace time numbered 9, were only increased to 10