"لجنة بلاد الرافدين. تقرير اللجنة المُعينة بموجب قانون البرلمان للتحقيق في عمليات الحرب في بلاد الرافدين، بالإضافة إلى تقرير خاص أعده القائد ج. ويدجوود، الحاصل على وسام الخدمة المتميزة، وعضو البرلمان، وملاحق. لندن: مكتب الأدوات القرطاسية الملكية، ١٩١٧." [و‎‎١‎٩] (٢٤٨/٣٧)

PART VII.—OPERATIONS FOR RELIEF OF KUT.
35
front-line trench without suffering heavily in doing so. Unfortunately the supporting
lines failed to maintain the advantage thus won, they were driven back and the Turks
retook their lost trenches.
27. General Gorringe considered Sanaiyat to be the key to the position, and that
if this attack had succeeded the relief of Kut in all probability would have followed. It
appears that no such favourable opportunity recurred.
There was great cause for anxiety in the state of the supplies of the relieving force.
The Army was living from hand to mouth, a state of things to which the usual deficiency
of transport largely contributed. Still all hope was not abandoned ; the Army Com
mander, Sir Percy Lake, had come up, and under his instructions further attempts were
made. The troops responded to the call, and continuous fighting went on till the 22 nd.
Occasional successes were gained, the 3rd Division accomplishing some good fighting ;
but hardly any real progress w r as made. The heavy floods made all movements most
difficult, and the men at times could not even use their rifles, which were clogged with
mud. After 16 days’ continuous fighting, not only against the Turks, but against the
floods, all hope of relieving Kut had to be given up. The losses had exceeded 33 per cent.,
and were even greater in British officers, and the fighting efficiency of the force was
seriously affected.
28. Kut managed to hold out for another week ; then the inevitable happened, and
it surrendered after a most determined defence on April 29th. Right up to the end of the
siege General Townshend and his brigadiers retained the confidence and allegiance of their
men. One witness informed us that after the terms of surrender had been settled and the
Generals were departing in a steamboat as prisoners of war, their men formed up along
the riverside and gave them a parting cheer as a proof of their unbroken loyalty.
The extremities to which the garrison was reduced during their long-drawn agony
are vividly depicted in Colonel Hehir’s report and in General Townshend’s telegrams
from Kut. The difficulties in rationing the Indian troops were much enhanced by caste
prejudices as to food. For a long time many of them refused to eat horse or mule flesh.
Had it not been for this, these animals could not only have been used as food for the men,
but the grain they consumed could have been devoted to the same purpose. It is doubtful,
however, if this would have done more than prolong the agony. The relieving force was
not strong enough in artillery, high-explosive shells, and other appliances, without which
attacks on modern entrenchments seem absolutely futile.
Sir Percy Lake summarised the three main causes of failure as being—premature
attacks, inadequate transport, and exceptionally unfavourable weather. We endorse
these findings, but we add to it another, namely, insufficient numerical superiority over
a strongly-entrenched enemy. This drawback may be included under the head of “ inade
quate transport,” for during the whole of this period of critical fighting, large numbers of
troops and many guns were at Basra quite unable, for lack of transport, to be conveyed
and take part in the fighting.
29. As stated above, Force “ D ” was not a homogeneous body. For instance, in
each Cavalry Brigade of three regiments one was British, in each Infantry .Brigade of
four battalions one was British, the remaining units being Indian with a small proportion
of British officers. In many a hard-fought field these Indian soldiers proved themselves
worthy of standing shoulder to shoulder with their British comrades.
This army had been put to a severe test, the 6 th Division in particular. It had
been almost continuously fighting or marching or moving by w^ater for the best part of a
year. It had been repeatedly short of supplies, and owing to its frequent movements had
felt acutely the want of adequate water transport. Nevertheless it had performed feats
•of fighting and endurance of which any army might have been proud. The part of the
advance called by the troops “ Townshend’s Regatta* ’’was an astounding piece of work.
It may be that the moral of the troops fell off to a certain degree, but in what army
would this not have occurred after such ordeals as the battle of Ctesiphon, the defence
of Kut, and the series of stubbornly contested actions fought by the Tigris Army under
exceptionally unfavourable conditions in the vain efforts to relieve their beleaguered com
rades in Kut ? Whatever faults of organisation and equipment there may have been,
no discredit attaches to the fighting men for the failures of the operations in Mesopotamia.
30. During the hot season after the fall of Kut, the army suffered much from sickness,
and the transport and supply arrangements, though improving, were still inadequate In
E 2
(C 48—176)
* See Part IV., para. 8,