"لجنة بلاد الرافدين. تقرير اللجنة المُعينة بموجب قانون البرلمان للتحقيق في عمليات الحرب في بلاد الرافدين، بالإضافة إلى تقرير خاص أعده القائد ج. ويدجوود، الحاصل على وسام الخدمة المتميزة، وعضو البرلمان، وملاحق. لندن: مكتب الأدوات القرطاسية الملكية، ١٩١٧." [و‎‎١‎٠] (٢٤٨/١٩)

PART IV.—THE ADVANCE TO AMARA AND KUT.
On April 22 nd, General Townshend arrived in Mesopotamia, and took command
of the 6 th Division, On the 24th, General Nixon directed him to proceed at once to Kurna
and reconnoitre the Turkish position north of that place with a view to attacking it.
In the meantime the Home Government was concerned as to the safety of the oil
pipe and on the 19th, the Secretary of State urged an immediate move against the Turks
in that region, and on the same day General Nixon asked India for another Cavalry
Brigade in the following terms :—
The Cavalry Brigade now with this Force cannot meet the demands which will shortly be made on that
arm. The despatch of another Cavalry Brigade which should include a British Cavalry Regiment is requested.
It is very necessary that we should have the British unit. In view of heavy work which obstructions in the river,
and other works will cause, I also beg for the despatch of a battalion of Pioneers.
4. In reply to Sir John Nixon’s request the Viceroy regretted that he was unable
to supply any more Cavalry, and on April 24th, the Secretary of State made the
following communication to the Viceroy : —
Your decision in connexion with Nixon’s request for a brigade of Cavalry is concurred in. To say nothing
of the impossibility of complying with his request the approach of the hot season renders it undesirable to
despatch any more troops, especially British. An important offensive movement is indicated by Nixon’s
demand. Any advance beyond the present theatre of operations will not be sanctioned by Government at
this moment, and I presume Nixon clearly understands this. During the summer we must confine ourselves
to the defence of oil-interests in Arabistan and of the Basra Vilayet.
If an advance to Amara with a view to establishing an outpost for the purpose of controlling tribesmen
between there and Karun, thus adding to the security of the pipe-line is possible after smashing the enemy in
the direction of Karun I should, if such a proposal received your support, be prepared to sanction it. Any pro
posal involving possible demands for reinforcements or undue extension is to be deprecated however.
Our present position is strategically a sound one and we cannot at present afford to take risks by extending
it unduly. In Mesopotamia a safe game must be played.
This telegram was apparently sent in ignorance that Sir John Nixon’s instructions
from India involved the occupation of the vilayet of Basra, which includes both Amara a: 1
Nasariyeh, and extends to within a few miles of Kut-el-Amarah.
5. General Nixon at that time had two military objectives in view—one on the Kan; !
and the other on the Tigris River. He had at his disposal the Sixth and Twelfth Divisions
and a Cavalry Brigade. There had been trouble up the Karun River, and Genera
Gorringe, with two Infantry Brigades of the Twelfth Division and one Cavalry Brigade,
was sent up to -reopen communications with Ahwaz and to punish the enemy. This he
did very effectively, and he was able to demonstrate on his left flank towards Bisaitin.
This operation greatly assisted the impending advance of General Townshend up the Tigris,
and the floods prevented reinforcements from joining the Turkish forces on the Tigris in
time to oppose General Townshend’s advance. The Turkish forces facing General Gorringe
were so delayed on their march to Amara, that when they eventually reached it they found
General Townshend in occupation of the town. A portion of their advance guard was
captured, and the remainder had to seek safety in dispersion with the loss of two guns.
6 . The Viceroy had advocated the advance to and occupation of Amara. Amara
town possessed importance, not only from an administrative and commercial point
of view, but also as a strategical military post, and there were obvious advantages likely
to accrue from its occupation. On May 23rd, the Viceroy indicated in a telegram that
Sir John Nixon proposed to take the offensive towards Amara, but he would not proceed
beyond Amara without the sanction of the Secretary of State. In reply, on May 23rd, the
Secretary of State sanctioned the proposed movement—
On the clear understanding that the General Officer Commanding Force “ D ” is satisfied that he can concen
trate a sufficient garrison at Amara to defy any attack from Baghdad during the summer. . . . We can send him
no more troops and he must clearly understand that his action must be guided by this fact. Arrangements for
the move in question must have been made some days back, and I am of opinion that General Nixon should
have submitted his proposals before the last moment. Under present circumstances only the Cabinet should
decide questions jointly affecting civil and military policy.
As in the case of the telegram of April 24th, this communication seems also to imply
a lack of appreciation by the Home Government of the scope of Nixon’s instructions
from India.
7. On May 27th, Lord Crewe left the India Office and was succeeded by Mr. Chamber
lain, who at once endorsed his predecessor’s policy of caution in the following words
on May 28th :—
Till I know the immediate objects contemplated and the force with which General Nixon is advancing',
I am unable to give further instructions. Our policy must depend partly on local factors, forces locally available,
and partly on situation elsewhere. I should like to be informed what force General Nixon considers necessary
for garrisoning Amara, and how generally he proposes to distribute his troops during the summer if the occtn.
pation of that town is contemplated.
(C 4S—176) C