ملف ١٨٥٥\١٩٠٤ الجزء ٨ "الكويت:- موقف زعماء شبه الجزيرة العربية تجاه قبائل الداخلية (نجد إلخ.)" [و‎‎١‎٢‎٦] (٣٣٦/٢٤٩)

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ENCLOSURES.
Sir
* No. 7, Secret, dated 11th January 1906,
and enclosures.
dated 21st April 1866.
Yol. X., p. 116).
(Aitchison’s Treaties,
Enclosure No. 1.
India Office to Foreign Office.
India Office,
22nd February 1906.
With reference to my letter of the 29th April 1904 as to the
affairs of Nejd, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Morley to enclose, to
be laid before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a
further Secret Letter* from the
Government of India on the sub
ject of a visit which the Wahabi
Amir Abdul Aziz bin Saood is reported to be intending to make
to the Pirate Coast and Muscat in the coming spring.
It will be observed that, on the 5th December 1905, the Government
of India authorised enquiries being made of the Sheikh of Koweit as to
Bin Saood’s intentions, but that the result has not yet been reported.
In the meanwhile the Government of India, in view of the serious
consequences which would ensue if Bin Saood should succeed in
establishing his ascendency over the Trucial Chiefs or the Sultan of
Muscat, suggest that he should be approached either through the Sheikh
of Koweit or the Sultan of Muscat or other suitable channel, with a
view to ascertaining whether he is prepared to stand by the Declarationj*
of his predecessor not to oppose or
t See Declaration of the Wahabi Amir, i n j ure British subjects residing in
his territories, and not to interfere
with the Arab tribes in alliance
with the British Government. In regard to this I am to observe that
the declaration made in 1866 was not proposed, or even formally
accepted, by the British Government, and it contained a leteience to
the claim of the Wahabis upon the customs of Muscat. The Govern
ment of India further suggest that, in the event of Bin Saood s failing
to give the necessary assurance, he should be warned that any attempt
on his part to interfere in Oman or on the Pirate Coast would be
regarded as an unfriendlv act, and that suitable measures would be taken
to°frustrate it. These measures in the opinion of the Government of
India might consist either of a more stringent embargo on the import
of arms at Koweit and elsewhere, or, in the case of necessity, of actual
armed assistance from British ships to the Sheikhs threatened.
The serious consequences which might arise from the re-estabhs -
ment by Bin Saood of the Wahabi dynasty throughout the centre ot
Arabia were referred to in the Despatch from His Majesty s Amoassad or
at Constantinople of the 10 th May 1904, No. feea
further complicated if, as appears to he the case, Bin Saood l as been
recoomised by the Turkish Government and has acknowled^td t
suzerainty oAhe Sultan. It will be observed that the Governrcen of
India consider that it would be useless and uudesirable to brim,
pressure to bear on Bin Saood through the Turkish authorities.
p So far as Muscat is concerned I am to observe hat the E cnch
Government is conjointly with the British overnme Wahabis
independence, and, in the event of interference ^^“^fof India
the Trucial Chiefs the measures proposed by ‘‘f ‘ , 1 al)le
might not he effective. For instance, sue i con i - . . arms
to exercise over the importation of arms into Arabia s l^d to arm
imported by British subjects. The questions raised by the Governme
S. 10.
A 2