ملف ١٨٥٥\١٩٠٤ الجزء ٨ "الكويت:- موقف زعماء شبه الجزيرة العربية تجاه قبائل الداخلية (نجد إلخ.)" [و‎‎١‎١‎٧] (٣٣٦/٢٣١)

No. 21S1, dated Bushire, the 16th (received 24th) September igoS.
From— Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
T °~ S,R I L H- U a '- ^ £ ANE> K n C -'- E - C - S1 -* Se ^ y to the Government of
India in the Foreign Department.
1 have the honour to forward, for the consideration of Government, a copy
Political Agent, Koweit, to Resident, No. 3x3, of the communication marninallv Quoted
dated the 28th August ico% T u • i r &
. , . which I have received from the Political
* "<*v C iclcivcu rrom tne rontical
Agent at Koweit, on the subiect of the aspirations of Bin Saood to enter into
closer relations with the British Government.
1 2 ’* T In tlie ? ame connect i° n ) ^ have the honour to refer to paragraph 2 of mv
letter No. 64 of 23rd February last to your address.
Subsequently when touring on the Arab Coast in May last I had an
opportunity of meeting Sheikh Jasim bin Thani at his summer quarters at Lusail,
and on that occasion he expressed himself to much the same effect on behalf of
Bin Saood, saying that the latter was now strong enough to drive the Turks
out of Nejd and A1 Hassa and asking whether in the event of his coming down j
to the coast, the British Government could not see their way to give him the I
same measure of protection by sea as they gave to Sheikh Mubarak and
other Arab Chiefs on the Coast, in pursuance of their traditional policy of
preserving the maritime peace of the Gulf. He added that it would be a simple
matter for Bin Saood to meet a British officer at the coast, if that course were
considered desirable.
In reply, I told Sheikh Jasim that this was a question to which I could not
give him any definite answ r er offhand and without instructions from the Govern
ment of India.
just at that time the news of the death of Bin Rashid at the hands of his
rival reached the coast and the situation seemed so kaleidoscopic that I delayed
making any report to Government until matters had crystallised somewhat.
I have now received from Captain Knox a communication from Sheikh.
Mubarak to much the same effect as the foregoing. We have thus been
approached from t hree directio ns and I think there ean be no doubt that these
representations may be held to have been inspired by Bin Saood personally.
3. Bin Rashid’s death at the hands of his rival had an important influence on
the situation, and as the Government of India have been informed, the three
cornered peac e of which the possibility was indicated in paragraph 2 of my letter
No. 620 of 18th March has lately taken shape.
Whether it will endure on its own merits or whether the Turks will at once
ggf- themselves to undo it, it is impossible to prophesy, but seeing that the
present Bin Rashid is a mere youth of 18, it is hardly likely that he will be able
to make any serious stand against Bin Saood for some time to come. The
juncture is consequently a convenient one for an examination and review of the
political situation in Central Arabia and of our attitude towards Bin Saood and
1 venture to hope that Government will take advantage of it for that purpose.
4 . While I believe I am right in thinking that
regard with
* (1) Foreign Department telegram No. 1748-
E A., dated 19th May 1904.
(2) Foreign Department letter No. 3397-E.B.,
dated 8th October 1904.
His Majesty’s Government
no favour the idea of the
Turks establishing themselves in Nejd,* I
am at the same time aware that it has
been a recognised principle of their policy
not to allow themselves to become involved in the tempestuous politics of
Central Arabia. Nevertheless it must be conceded that we have principles and
interests to consider other than the pursuit of the purely negative doctrine of
aloofness above mentioned, and I cannot see that these are in any way served by
our carrying that doctrine to an extreme point and by our treating the predomi
nant Arab element in Nejd with an active neglect which not only places us in an
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