"ملف X/٣ الاضطرابات والغارات قرب البصرة وفي المنطقة الداخلية للكويت" [ظ‎‎٤‎٤] (٣٠٣/٨٨)

ful flight. I have a’so heard since that Shaikh Jabir and Bin Sand did not have
that singleness of purpose or plan which is essential to any military operation.
It is apparently admitted that in point of numbers the combined Bin Saud and
Bin Subah force was superior, though Sadun, who had no camelry at all, had a
preponderance in horsemen. I am afraid that Shaikh Mubarak’s tale of the
losses is fictitious as from other sources I learn that among the killed (reported
at anything up to 150) is a small Umtair Shaikh ; that the refugees have been
returning to Jahra without clothes riding 5 and 6 to a camel, and promising
Bedou’m exhorbitant sums for transport to Kuwait.
5. As soon as news of the defeat reached the Shaikh he began fresh and
energetic measures for the raising of another and larger force, and to this end
minute details have been collected of the population, each man’s wealth, number
of able-bodied men ; etc. The entire stock of arms and ammunition has been
commandeered by the Shaikh from the arms-dealers, who are to receive bonds for
their value drawn on the Customs receipts. There is much grumbling (though
through fear of the Shaikh it is expressed in hushed whispers) at the amount of
money contributions demanded, especially from foreigners such as the richer
Persian merchants.
6. I have been fortunate in obtaining secretly some interesting details as to
the Shaikh’s organization for military purposes with an estimate of the numbers
being collected for this second expedition, which 1 submit in a separate note
attached hereto, as it may be of use to the Intelligence Branch at Army Head
quarters. It will be seen that a force of some 15,000 men (including Kuwait
levies, Bedouins and Bin Saud’s contingent) is contemplated.
The expedition is unpopular in the town chiefly on the score of the heavy
expenses it entails on all and the fear that the Shaikh will resort to it as a pretext
for further increasing taxation. However, there is no one who would dare to
venture to suggest to the Shaikh that the game is not worth the candle, though
it is a fact that the origin of these retributory steps against Shaikh Sadun was his
successfu l raid (combined with the Dhaffir) of some 300 Kuwait sheep and a
few camels.
7. On receiving your First Assistant’s instructions to convey a warning to
the Shaikh I took the first opportunity of riding out to his camp at Sirra and
bringing forward the subject. As vas to be anticipated the Shaikh assured me
that the Turkish authorities were well pleased at his action against Sadun and
that the Wali during his last visit to Fao had commended him and wished him
success. Sadun was for some time a refugee from the Turkish authorities, but I
hear that the Turks found him a still greater nuisance as an outlaw and so re
instated him in some honorary post, though whether this is a fact 1 have no cer
tain information. The Shaikh w'ent on to explain that he intended nothing which
could possibly involve him in conflict with them or with others, but that his
honour as an Arab Shaikh was concerned, for his people had been robbed and
Sadun had made no restitution of the property as Shaikh Mubarak is generally
successful in securing after such raids. His sole object was to punish Sadun
and according to Arab ideas a counter-raid is certainly justified in default of re
stitution. I recalled Colonel Kemball’s warning to the Shaikh and explained that
one could never tell to what result expeditions of this nature would lead even
tually and for that reason such adventures did not commend themselves to Gov
ernment. The Shaikh replied that he always bore Colonel Kemball’s w’armng in
mind but that in the present case he was practically forced to assert his authority
to secure his people from molestation.
8. My previous impression (stated in my letter No. C-12 dated the 9th
March 1910) that the expedition might possibly be used for an excursion against
Ibn Rashid has proved incorrect; and therefore 1 was not able to suggest defi
nitely the abandonment of the proposed second attempt, such a suggestion being
an unwarrantable incursion into the Shaikh s own internal politics. 1 endeavoured
to show him hosv utterly incommensurate the best possible success would be with
the cost of fitting cut his force and alter reiterating Government’s disapproval