"ملخص لعلاقات الحكومة البريطانية مع قبائل وشيوخ عربستان. بقلم الملازم أ. ت. ويلسون، القائم بأعمال القنصل في عربستان" [ظ‎‎٢‎٠] (١٤٣/٤٥)

26
seems to have been that the establishment of the Customs at Mohammerah
was preliminary to a further extension of the powers of the Central Govern
ment in his territories and that it would be followed by other measures of the
same kind, wdiich w T ould result in the curtailment and ultimate extinction of
his authority and privileges.
Thus it came about that, in order to placate him and secure his acquies
cence in the new regime, the Persian Government found it necessary to give
him three farmans recognizing the proprietary rights of himself and of his
tribes in the districts then under his control, so far as they had not been
already alienated to the Nizam-es-Saltaneh, and securing him and his tribes
against any future increase of taxation.
Translations of these farmans are printed as Appendices to this precis.
On the 20th January 1900, Sir H. M. Durand, His Majesty’s Minister at
Tehran, wrote to Col. Meade on the subject of the proposed establishment
of the Imperial Persian Customs at Mohammerah as follows :—
I hear the Belgians and the Sadr ’Azam are determined to take over the Moham
merah Customs, but by amicable arrangement with the Shaikh, if possible : I
have advised them not to try to force him.
In a memorandum enclosed in the same letter he wrote :—
As to the withdrawal of the Customs from Mohammerah, I will do all I can to help
him. He may rely upon our hearty good will at all times and upon our help
whenever we can give it without ill faith to the Persian Government.
Later, in 1900, the proposal to establish a Persian Customs Department
in ’Arabistan officered by Belgians was actively pushed and the Shaikh up-
proached privately on the subject on behalf of the Government by Persian
friends in Tehran.
The Shaikh told His Majesty’s Consul that if he allowed such a contin
gency to come to pass, his tribes would revolt and depose him, if not kill him,
for having betrayed his trust. The least he could do would be to resign and
retire to hi s estates in Turkey. The most he could do would be to rebel. He
feared that the Persians would gradually reduce his power, taking one dis
trict^ from him after another, and recollected the story of Khalifa Amin bin
Harun-ar-Rashid, who, as his brother advanced against him said “ What is
left is enough till only Baghdad remained : then he said “ Baghdad is
enough till his brother took Baghdad and killed him.
Persians, he said, had never been able to manage Arabs except through
Arabs, and compared his position vis a vis Persia to that of Khedive of
Lgypt vis a vis Turkey.
at V th ; Colonel Meade > then Political Resident at Bushire,
on 11th March 1900 the latter told the Shaikh that the Persian Government
tv!tY +i t0 esta J1S1 1 a P usto ^-house at Mohammerah, and that in common
u °- 1 1 er ^ ^y P a d the right to collect dues at their own ports. The
s i ab ! llty of P ersla depended on the proposed establishment of
possible ' W 10 ' " C Cim < nob °PP ose > an d he hoped that some compromise was
„ . I i '° Shaikh said it was impossible, his headmen had never paid dues
r M d j at ? had always been f ree ’ whilst the districts of Fallahiyeh and Jar-
had from ^d^ti^LllecLfChlrf rpSge frLdmheTZThe
^ffi^r^lattenTn^h^ bTecf gam ' He ^ hithert ° had
Colonel Meade replied that we could not advise him to accept or refuse
b^pSTe 3 * ' 8 We C ° U d d ° WaS t0 eXpreSS a hope that a compromise might
In 1901 much the same line was still taken on this subiect bv Shaikh