ملف رقم ٢١٨٢ لسنة ١٩١٣، الجزء ٤ "الخليج الفارسي: السياسة تجاه ابن سعود (بعثة النقيب شكسبير)" [و‎أ‎‎٦‎٤] (٤٢٦/١٢٤)

'jg!''"- 1
Bin Sami was expected to move camp 15 miles towards him and then
attack. General belief was that a victory for Bin Saud was certain.
—ser—
Dated Basrah, the 18th January (received 1st February) 1915.
From— Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Z. Cox, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Political President in
the Persian Gulf,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Depart
ment.
In continuation of my telegrams Nos. 68 , 69 and70-B., dated the 16th and
17th January 1915, on the subject of Bin Saud, I have the honour to enclose, for
No. S- 13 , dated 1915 . * he ,. information of the Government of
India, .a copy of the marginally cited
letter which I have received from ^Captain W. H. I. Shakespear, C.I.E, on
special duty.
No. S.-13, dated Camp-XVlI, Central Arabia, the 4th January 1915.
From— Captain W. H. I. Shakespear, C.I.E., I.A., Political Officer on special duty.
To—The Political Kesident in the Persian Gulf, Basrah.
In continuation of my letter No. S-7, dated 7th December 1914, from
Koweit, I have the honour to report that, leaving Koweit on the 12th Decem
ber, I reached Abdul Aziz “ Bin Saud’s ” camp on the 31st December 1914.
The Amir’s last letter had led me to expect him to be nearer Koweit, but poor
grazing north of the Dahana and the presence of a large force compelled him
to camp at Khufsa (about Lat 26° 12'N. Long 45° 35 E.) and entailed
upon me a journey of some 330 miles. I was received very cordially by
“ Bin Saud ” and his brothers and met many friends among his headmen.
2 . General ^Political Situation .—It will be of interest to note here that
the attitude of Central Arabia, so far as I am able to guage it in this camp,
is very sympathetic towards Great Britain, antagonistic to Germany and one
of hatred to Turkey combined with a sense of relief and a hope that at last
the machinations of the Ottoman Government in Nejd may come to an end.
There is unaffected rejoicing at the British successes in Basrah and Gurna,
while not a trace of fanatical spirit adverse to Great Britain is visible. By
far the most potent factor, other than the personal predilections of the Amir and
his family, in producing this favourable result in Wahabi Arabia has been
the British Proclamation regarding the Holy Places. I was informed
by some who were present that Abdul Aziz “ Bin Saud ” had the pro
clamation read out at one of his “ Majlis ” in Buraidah when a large
number of his notables were present, commenting on it as proof of
British sincerity and drawing comparisons much to our advantage between
the Government which, though of another faith, was prepared to bind itself
by such a proclamation and one which had continually oppressed its subjects,
though of its own faith, and attempted to proclaim a “ Jihad ” while allying
itself to another Christian Power. J. can say with assurance that a religious
war as hoped for by the Ottoman Government has no supporters in’ Central
Arabia. “ Bin Saud ” himself has already practically imprisoned a turkish j
officer in Hasa, sent to him to help train his troops for the war, and is keeping
India, Foreign Secretary’s
No ' ry> . VI, dated
lo FEB 1915