ملف رقم ٢١٨٢ لسنة ١٩١٣، الجزء ٤ "الخليج الفارسي: السياسة تجاه ابن سعود (بعثة النقيب شكسبير)" [و‎‎٤‎٩] (٤٢٦/٩٤)

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eye-witnesses, being that the Turks had promised them victory, whereas a
severe rebuff was all they received.
5. In the circumstances detailed above, little need be said upon the
subject of the Turkish efforts to arouse religious feeling among the Arabs
of these regions. Such an aspect of the war has entered but little into
the coiisj derations of the Muntafik, and the Basravis seem to be quite
unaffected by it. The attempt to raise a Jehad has had no effect upon
the large and important tribes of Central and North-Central Arabia, and I
have not met any Arab who has taken seriously the supposed conversion
of prominent Germans to Islam.
6. In connection with the tribes and localities referred to in this com
munication, a reference is invited to the Gazetteer Map of Arabia which was
compiled in the Foreign Office, Simla, during the years 1905-08 ; and I now
pass on to some mention of the tribes further south, who have had more or
less acquaintance with British officials, and have come more under the
influence of our friends among the Arab chiefs and notables. First come
the Zaffir, a large and scattered tribe who inhabit the country west and
north-west of Kuwait, as far as Samawah. The Zaffir, who could probably
Put 5,000 fighting men into the field, have throughout declined all Turkish
invitations to take up arms on their behalf, giving as their reason a feud
which exists between them and the Muntafik, but they have also been
advised by some of our friends to stand aloof. The Yuarin, who dwell
nearer to the coast in about the same latitude, and whose strength is perhaps
from 3,000 to 3,000 fighting men, have also remained neutral, partly owing
t° enmity with the Muntafik and partly to the influence of Shaikh Mubarak
of Kuwait, who has also induced the Bani Malik, a roving tribe who come
from the left bank of the Shatt-ul-Arab to pass the spring and winter in
Kuwait territory, to take a similar course.
<. lor the neutrality of the Shammar, the numerous inhabitants of the
eastern portion of the desert tract known as the Nafud which lies to the
south-west of Kuwait, and the powerful Umni Pair who dwell in the Summan
tract south-east of the Nafud, we are indebted partly to the influence of
Shaikh Mubaiak and partly to the skilful diplomacy of Bin Sand, the Amir
of Nejd, who by organising a campaign against Ibn Rashid, the Shammar
chief, and enlisting in his service the warriors of the Umm Tair, not only
provided himself with an excellent excuse for declining to assist the Turks
who were pouring invitations upon him, but compelled Ibn Rashid and the
Shammar to attend to their own defence. There never was any doubt as to
what line Bin Sand himself would take, but he might not have found it
possible to induce his people to take up our cause at an early stage of the
war, or to restrain them from assisting at our discomfiture had we suffered
a severe reverse at the hands of the Turks at a similar period.
8. It is impossible to speak too highly of the conduct of His Excellency
Shaikh Sir Mubarak of Kuwait, which has from the moment in which I
informed him that war with Turkey was imminent been that of a loyal and
honourable gentleman. He said on that occasion that all that he had was at
our disposal and that he would be victorious with us or perish with us, and
eveiythmg that he has said or done since has borne out the sincerity of his