"كتيّب سوريا (بما في ذلك فلسطين). لندن: إدارة استخبارات الأركان البحرية، يونيو ١٩١٩" [ظ‎‎٨‎٦] (٧٣٨/١٧٧)

166
MILITARY HISTORY
it was not attacked. Jubeil and Haifa and Jaffa could not be
and were not seriously defended.
Ibrahim Pasha gained an unbroken series of victories over
the Turks in 1832 and 1839 (Homs, Beilan, Konieh, Nizib).
His army consisted chiefly of Egyptian peasants drilled by
French instructors and led by Turkish officers. His success
was due to his good generalship and that of his staff, including
notably Suleiman Pasha (a Frenchman, Joseph Seve), and
still more to the amazing blunders of the Turkish commanders.
At Homs only one half of the Ottoman army consisted of
regular troops, drilled in the modern European manner.
Besides, owing to the fault of the commanders, they fought
under most disadvantageous conditions. After the first
victory Ibrahim’s prestige and the corresponding lack of
confidence amongst the Turks contributed to the continued
success of the Egyptian army. It may still, therefore, be
maintained that if the issue of these battles had been decided
by the fighting qualities of the Egyptian and the Ottoman
soldiers, the latter would have shown their usual superiority.
Indeed, the discipline and general morale of Ibrahim’s armies
were far from good. At Nizib, especially, the quality of the
Egyptian army, by this time mixed with Syrian levies, was
poor (1839). In 1840 the desertion of Syrian and Egyptian
troops, on a great scale, was common.
Ibrahim’s poor defence of Syria in 1840 has called forth
sharp criticism of his capacity as a general. His army was
scattered in garrisons and camps all over the country, and
divisions numbering 1,000 or 2,000 or 4,000 men were attacked
and defeated by superior numbers of the enemy. If he had
assembled even the garrisons of the coast towns and the troops
of central Syria he would have been superior to all attack 1
1 Quite reliable figures are not available. Suleiman Pasha at first had
nearly 7,000 men under his command in Beirut and its neighbourhood.
The garrison of Saida may have numbered 3,000 men and the garrison of
Tripoli is put at the same strength (or alternatively at 4,000). The strength
of these garrisons may have been deduced from the paper strength of the
regiments in question. The garrison of ‘Akka could not be moved (3-4,000
men). The troops in the Biqa‘, afterwards brought to Lebanon, may