"كتيّب سوريا (بما في ذلك فلسطين). لندن: إدارة استخبارات الأركان البحرية، يونيو ١٩١٩" [و‎‎٨‎٣] (٧٣٨/١٧٠)

SYRIA UNDER THE OTTOMAN TURKS 159
in the late afternoon, Napoleon with fresh troops (2,500 men)
attacked the Turkish army from two points in the rear, and
at once they broke and fled. The French had not sufficient
cavalry to inflict much loss on the discomfited enemy. But
no further attempt to raise the siege of ‘Akka was made by
the Syrian pashas.
Napoleon’s invasion crippled the resources of Syria in men
and material, and taught the pashas that they could not hope
for success in a pitched battle with the French. So far, it
accomplished its purpose. On the other hand, the siege of
‘Akka being unsuccessful, the occupation of Palestine became
impossible and the retreat of the French gave the whole
campaign an aspect of failure. The critical event of the
invasion was, therefore, the siege of ‘Akka. A combination
of circumstances determined the event. In the first place
the defence was bravely and skilfully conducted by Jezzar’s
troops and by his Ottoman gunners. Napoleon, in his
memoirs, remarks that the fighting qualities of his opponents
told in siege warfare more effectively than in open warfare.
Besides, a French engineer, Louis-Edmond de Phelipeaux,
superintended the construction of defence works and counter
mines with an ability equal to that of the besiegers. Then,
further, the guns of the city and of the English ships were
superior to the French guns and were better supplied with
munitions. Finally, most important of all, the command of
the sea was held by the defenders. Owing to this Napoleon s
transport and means of communication were always disabled,
and reinforcements and supplies could be introduced without
hindrance into ‘Akka by sea. On the day before the siege
began the ships which brought the French siege guns and
supplies from Egypt were captured off ‘Akka by Sir Sidney
Smith. These guns were mounted at once for the defence of
the town. Even this single misadventure probably made
the difference between success and failure. Other guns were
brought seven weeks later overland from Jaffa, but it was
then too late.
At no period of the campaign were the French transport