"دليل بلاد فارس، الجزء III، وهو يتضمن محافظة فارس، لورستان، عربستان، خوزستان، يزد، كرمانشاه، أردلان، كردستان" [ظ‎‎١‎٧‎٩] (٦٨٦/٣٦٣)

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KAR—KAU
equally advantageous to England from a political and from a commer
cial point of view. Considering the political aspect of the case, it
may be remarked that it would give England, as the country which
would most largely employ the new route, paramount influence in
Southern Persia, while the possibility of bringing troops within a few
hundred miles of the most important towns would naturally contribute
largely to the re-establishment of British influence at Tihran.
From a commercial point of view it would appear that the only
chance of successful competition with Russian trade is the opening up
of the Karun. Twenty years ago British merchants almost monopo
lised the trade of Persia; at this moment English goods are rarely seen
beyond Isfahan and even at this place Russian produce is sold in
equal quantity with British merchandise.
This change is due to the development of steam navigation on the
Caspian and the construction of good roads from the Caspian to Tih
ran and Mashhad. If nothing is done towards developing communi
cations with the Persian Gulf, British trade will be driven out of all
the wealthy parts of Persia.
The importance to British interests of opening up the Karun by
British means is enhanced by the presence and designs of the French,
whose design is to construct a dam at Ahwaz and to irrigate and
cultivate the adjacent lands by a French Company. This scheme of a
dam at Ahwaz, which was once on the point of being conceded by the
Shah, is incompatible with the English one of opening up the naviga
tion of the river. It is sufficiently obvious what considerations in
duce Russia to encourage French designs. The proposal to open the
navigation of the Karun originated entirely from a firm of British
merchants who were supported by the Government on account of the
obvious advantages to British commerce. Hitherto, however, the
SkalFs Government have declined to assist in any way, or even to
allow foreign steam vessels to run on the Karun river. The Shah's
first peremptory refusal was dated February 1879.
In 1881 the Zil-us-Sultan, who had been appointed Governor of Fars
did his best for the scheme, but the Shah's opposition was not to be
overcome, and, finally, in February 1883 negotiations on the subject
with the Shah's Government ceased, and it was thought advisable to
leave the matter in abeyance.
(Chamjoain — Ross — Robertson — Wells — Thomson.)
KARUN—
The following notes are extracted from Lieutenant-Colonel Bell's
“South-West Persia," 1884—
“ Many opinions have been given upon the practicability of opening
up the navigation of the Kaiun river, some favourable, others un
favourable, all of which will be found fully recorded in the Karun
River Precis, 1879-83 (Indian Foreign Department, Confidential
Paper). From viewing the river in March and April 1884, Major
Bell concluded that its navigation would be feasible at all seasons for
fiat-bottomed boats of a burden up to 50 tons provided with expansive
sails similar to those navigating the Indus at Sukkur, and for flat-