ملف رقم ٢١٨٢ لسنة ١٩١٣ الجزء ١١ " الجزيرة العربية: العلاقات مع ابن سعود والنزاع على منطقتي نجد والحجاز" [ظ‎‎٣‎١‎٤] (٦٧٨/١٨٣)

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of the 26th December, 1915, applied equally to aggression hy King Hussein These
three telegrams had all been repeated to Cairo, and on the 20th February the Foreign
Office telegraphed to Lord Allenby for his views on the possibility of Hussein having
taken the action alleged by Ibn Sand either before or after his own recent visit to
(E 346) Jedd On the 20th February the Foreign Office received copies of two further telegrams
V } from the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, of the 12th and 15th February. In the first
he detailed the instructions given by him to the Political Agent, Bahrein, an
second he reported the Political Agent’s appreciation of the situation .
/ F 5 46 ) On the 23rd February the India Office, m consultation with the Foreign Office,
authorised the Civil Commissioner to reply as follows to Ibn baud s three requests.
1. His Maiestv’s Government agreed that the existing status quo must oe main
tained "throughout the period of Ibn Sands absence at then invitation,
from his own territory, and had informed King Hussein accordingly.
2 His Maiestv’s Government had already recognised their obligations to use
every influence in their power to prevent encroachment on Ibn bauds
territories. An encroachment by Hussein would, of course, come within
the terms of this assurance, but "His Majesty s Government were unable to
satisfy themselves as to what constituted an encroachment, so long as the
boundary between the two States remained undehmited, which it must
necessarily be until the two rulers had arrived at an agreement. .
3 His Majesty’s Government shared with Ibn Sand his anxiety to see the Pilgrim
route ipen to Mecca. It was for this reason that they were anxious to
hasten the settlement of outstanding differences between himself and
King Hussein.
If after the receipt of this message Ibn Sand still refused to proceed to Jeddah or
elsewhere to meet Hussein, the Civil Commissioner was instructed to inform him that
His Maiestr’s Government had learned with great surprise of his hesitation to take
steps the expediency of which they had always understood him to appreciate. If e
still persisted in his refusal the Civil Commissioner was to sound him as to whether he
would consent to go to Jeddah Port and interview Hussein on one of His Majesty s
shins provided Hussein himself would consent to this course. , ,
P On the same day the India Office informed the Foreign Office that they regarded
Colonel Wilson’s explanation as generally satisfactory in character, but t at t ey
thought it desirable that he should be furnished with a clear expression of the views
of His Majesty’s Government on the pafticular expressions employed by him m
describing the political situation in Syria and the conditions in Sherif 1 \ eisa [ s ffi arrn [;
Also on the 23rd February a telegram was received m the foreign Office horn
Flis Majesty’s High Commissioner at Cairo, in which he said that he considered it
most inadvisable to give Ibn Sand any such undertaking as that which had been
demanded by him. On the 26th February the loreign Office repeated to Lord
Allenby a telegram which had been despatched by the India Office m consultation
with them on the 23rd February, and instructed him to inform Hussein that His
Majesty’s Government expected him to preserve the status quo during Ibn bauds
/F On the 27th February the Foreign Office concurred in a draft telegram from t e
India Office to the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, in which they pointed out a
policy of His Majesty’s Government, which aimed at the maintenance ot peace
between Ibn Sand and Hussein, and the discouragement of aggressive action on
either side, seemed less likely to be achieved if either party were encouraged m tbe
belief that his rivals were helpless. , j i i j • rvn o
On the 3rd March Lord Allenby telegraphed that he had had no previo
intimation of the charges brought forward against Hussein by Ibn au . e ^ pLi
of Syria had little sympathy with Hussein, and the relations between hmr and ieisal
were rather strained, so that it would be unlikely that the Sherif was at th
any Jihad movement in Syria. At the same time, he was un ou e y y i rl ‘ l . | t
eves of many Arab Moslems, and he would probably fee himself bound to repudiate
anv partition of Syria, and to identify himself with the Syrian Nationa is s. H s
previous loyalty inclined Lord Allenby to believe that he would take no action unlea
forced to do so by circumstances, and that he still hoped for a so u ion w
render possible the maintenance of his friendship with Great Britain. i m
(E 922) On the 4th March Lord Allenby suggested that Hussein and Ibn Saud shou d
' ' meet in London, Hussein had already been invited to visit London, and Ibn Sa
(E. 456)
(E. 514)
(E. 887)