"القرض الفارسي. برقيات، ٢٠ يناير - ١ أبريل." [و‎‎١‎٥‎٧] (٢٢/١٥)

• . v
■ y"
8
Moreover ■fa British advance through a British-Persian Bank is not a
ioan by British Government, a Russian advance through a Russo-Persian
Ban k would not be a loan by Russian Government, and it might he main-
tnmed .hat a Russo-Persian Bank (which might easily be formed) could
hold drafts on southern customs without violating Persian Agreement
With us. 3
. Still, if you are perfectly clear from your local knowledge that our plan
is impracticable, and if arrangements can be made for securing advance
now contemplated by you, and for preventing future advance on security
ol southern, poits to any other institution, as well as to any other Govern
ment, we die prepaied to recommend plan to Indian Government and Indian
Council.
(Repeat to India.)
From Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne,
28M March 1903.
(No. 42.) Your telegram No. 29.
It is difficult to say off-hand what conditions could he obtained, but no
doubt we could get more for a payment than for a regular loan by Bank.
I sounded Grand Vizier, as though from myself, as to former solution,
but he answered very guardedly, that he could express no opinion till he
had a definite proposal before him, and, in absence of precise instructions, I
shrank from saying more.
As your Lordship knows, I have always been in favour of beginning by a
small advance by Bank, say 200,000/. or 300,000/., without political
conditions, effect of which would simply be to prevent further loan from
Russia, to get hold of entire southern custom-houses, and to strengthen
position of English Bank.
I would then, a little later, w r hen our position was stronger, ask for some
more formal guarantee about southern roads and railways, as suggested by
India, intimating that if this were given, a larger loan or payment on very
easy terms might be given.
\Ve must get Persia a little more into our debt and under our influence
before we can negotiate for substantial gains insisted on by Viceroy; other
wise we shall simply repeat mistakes of previous years, and miss our end by
over-shooting the mark. The situation is one of great delicacy, which can
only be dealt with, as it was by Russia in 1900, by very patient methods at
first.
Cau your Lordship tell me why His Majesty’s Government object to my
proposed purchase of Bank shares; this would render Imperial Bank of
Persia, which is our principal political lever here, indestructible as a British
institution, and place us at once on same level as Russia ? Its disappearance
is a constant danger. . .
I think if loan is made through it as nominal [? group omitted | principal
plan of placing securities in Legation or so ear-marking our loan as to
prevent its passing into foreign hands quite feasible, there are, however,
details of which Persian Government must know nothing.
Caspian fisheries advance is still unconcluded. Russian Minister promises
it, but M. de Witte hangs back in hope of getting Pc
clobt) *
* 4 . T hr>nr mivatflv from Mr. Hardinge that Bank would take it up if
asked to, I have told lirand vizier vua., x
would be the case.
(Sent to India.)
believe
9