"زنزبار، شبه الجزيرة العربية، والخليج العربي" [ظ‎‎٤‎٤] (٨/٦)

6
British Officers could not consent to receive their
orders, and to be under the capricious authority, of
any mandarin who might be sent to hold local
command. We must not fall into the same error
again. Before, therefore, at all entertaining the
proposition, we must know exactly the footing on
which the steam fleet is to be entertained. If it be
placed on a footing corresponding with that of the
contingent troops entertained at the expense of the
Native Princes of India who have subsidiary rela
tions with us, then he might readily entertain the
proposition. In that case, however, the wishes of
the Shah’s durbar would have to be communicated
to the Ambassador, under whose discretion all
orders would be issued, and the diplomatic agents
in the Gulf, acting in communication with the
Ambassador, would find this steamer force a most
useful auxiliary in carrying out the views of the
Government for the suppression of piracy and the
preservation of tranquillity in the adjacent seas.
But even on this footing, it may be questioned
whether it is worth our while to go to the first
expense of providing the vessels, and to trust to
Persia for the regular payments necessary to main
tain them in efficiency. The credit of Persia, and
her reputation for probity and punctuality in her
dealings, is scarcely high enough to warrant our
entering into such engagements. There is too
much likelihood that the entire expense both of
providing and of maintaining this war-fleet would
be thrown on the British Government. Under the
probability of this, would it not be preferable if we
deem it desirable that there should be an establish
ment of war steamers in the Gulf, that we should
provide and maintain them for ourselves, and so be
able to employ them according to our views of
expediency, unembarrassed by any interference
from the Persian or from any other Native Court ?
b. 1 look upon it as quite premature to enterta
the proposition to send Commodore Crittenden, <
any Officer possessing similar experience of tl
naval duties in the Persian Gulf, to assist tl
Ambassador at Teheran in negotiating the co:
templated arrangement for the establishment of
Persian steam fleet in that quarter. We have fir
to determine whether to entertain the propositic
at all, and this, even if we are not disposed I
negative it absolutely on broad grounds of gener
policy, still, without further information, as befoi
pointed out, regarding the footing on which tl
Officers are to stand towards the Persian Goven
ment, and other details, which the Ambassad.
would!° en ? ble him t0 ascertain,
would, I think, be extremely unwise to send a nav
man to settle details. It would show an eagerne'
on our part to jump at the first proposition whk
would give the Persians great advantage in tf
subsequent negotiations. We should be fommitte
to an acceptance of it on the present vague an
6. The proposition
to send an ex
perienced naval
Officer to assist
the ambassador at
Teheran in settling
the details of such
an arrangement.