"زنزبار، مسقط وبلاد فارس. مذكرة من السكرتير السياسي" [ظ‎‎١‎٩] (٦/٤)

4
permanent protection of Persian commerce in the
Gulf, the Government of the Shah express a strong
desire to place some ships of war of her own in
these waters. These vessels the Shah wishes to he
commanded by English officers; and he requests
that the British Government will build them at his
own cost, the money to be repaid by instalments
from the Persian treasury. It is suggested that a
British Naval officer should be sent to Teheran to
discuss the subject.
Now, it is doubtless our duty to use our good
offices to restrain the otfensive proceedings of
Muscat, but in respect of the Bunder Abbas atlair,
we must be cautious not to commit ourselves to
any measure which would be interpreted into a
recognition of the Shah s right to close the agree
ment, on the ground that the present ruler of Muscat
is an usurper, as we have ourselves recognized him
as the legitimate sovereign of the country. And as
to the employment of a Persian flotilla in the Gulf,
I think the measure is to be deprecated, as it might
give rise to very inconvenient complications. 1
would not, however, at once discourage it. A
British Naval officer (an old officer ot the Indian
Navy, such as Captain Lynch or Captain Crut-
tenden,) might be commissioned to proceed to
Teheran to discuss the subject; but the sooner the
Shah is convinced that we will do what he wants,
and thus save his money, or, in other words, the
sooner the whole project is stranded the bettei.
These are the several complications upon which
Her Majesty’s Government are now called upon to
declare their opinions. The difficulty is very much
increased by the fact that there are official (or de
partmental ) as well as political embarrassments.
Abroad there are five local authorities. The Agent
at Zanzibar, who is partly under the Foreign, partly
under the India Office. The Resident at Bushire,
who is also under the India Office. The Political
Agent and Consul General in 1 urkish Arabia, who
is partly under the India Office, and partly under
the Foreign Office. (The last named is only in
directly mixed up with the particular complica
tions to which this memorandum relates.) And
then there is Her Majesty’s Minister at Teheran,
who is entirely under the Foreign Office. It would
be difficult in the circumstances above recited,
to prevent some conflicts of authority, and they
have very inconveniently arisen. It is unnecessary
to repeat here what has been said so often about
the divided responsibility of the Zanzibar Agent
and Consul. Turning in the other direction, we
see that the limits of the authority of the Resident
in the Persian Gulf, and his relations with the
British Minister at Teheran, have been the subject
of a lengthened correspondence, which the Foreign
Office has referred to the India Office for the opinion
of Sir Stafford Northcote. Nothing, moreover, is
more likely than that far more serious conflicts
should arise in the course of the present quarrel
between Muscat and Persia, Colonel Pelly being