ملف رقم ٩٤٨ لسنة ١٩٠٩ "بلاد فارس: الوضع في الجنوب؛ حالة الطرق. الهجوم على السيد بيل. برنامج حرس الطرق". [ظ‎‎٧‎٣] (٧٤٤/١٥١)

' I
that a practical reconciliation is, I fear, now impossible. Last May by reducing Soulef
ed-Dowleh to a position of absolute subordinacy, -and by assuring the Kawamis tha
the Government was on their side, it might have been possible to retain and compel
both parties to co-operate with the Government for the restoration of order.
however, the conflict between the interests of the two part.es has been so much^
aggravated that it can only be satisfactorily settled by the suppression of one or the
If this vital problem of the strife between the Kawamis and the Ilkhani of the
Kashgais is solved in a sense favourable to the authority of the Government the question
of the Kuhgelus and the many other turbulent marauders can be settled without
considerable difficulty. . • i •
As you are aware, I came to Ears strongly prejudiced against Kawamis and in
favour of Soulet-ed-Dowleh. Local study of the situation, however, convinced me that
the views I had brought with me from Tehran were erroneous. I came to the conclusion
that the interests of Soulet-ed-Dowleh were directly opposed to the re-establishment ol
the Government’s authority in Fars, and that the inteiests o t e awamis, on t e
contrary were at present identical with those of the Government, the Kawamis are
townsmen, and the authority they exercised oyer the Khamseh tribes was m the nature
of a governorship rather than of a chieftainship. Indeed, the official title of the head
of the Khamseh tribes is “hakim” (governor), not “ ilkham’ (chief of tribe), as m the
case of the head of the Kashgais. The authority of the Kawamis over their tribes,
therefore, generally increased or declined with the strength or weakness ot the
Government. The position of the Soulet-ed-Dowleh is quite the reverse. He is a
tribesman, and his power increases with the weakness of the Government and declines ,
with its strength. The above explanations will perhaps suffice to show why the
Kawamis must be in favour of, and Soulet must object to, a strong Government in
Fars. In other words, disorders in Fars suit the latter, and are very detrimental to the
former. _ . .
Turning from these general considerations to the particular question of the secunty
of the Bushire-Ispahan telegraph route, it is again evident that the interests of boulet-
ed-Dowleh are directly opposed to the restoration of order on that road. His net
revenues from tolls levied on caravans, and from the difference between the amount
realised by the sale of his cereals under normal conditions, ynd the increased amount
realised by their advantageous sale on the spot to muleteers using the Firuzabad, Jirreh,
and Sarhad routes during the year cannot be less than 100,000 tomans annually. Ihis
sum represents his net prohts ; the guards are not paid by him, but collect their
perquisites separately from the muleteers. It would require a very wise man to forgo,
without compulsion, this large revenue in the interests of general order and the develop
ment of trade. Soulet-ed-Dowleh has shown that he is not such a man, and the present
state of the telegraph route from Bushire to Shirez, and from Abadeh to Aminabad, is
directly due to him ; in fact, it is probable that some of the disorder prevailing on the
telegraph route between Shiraz and Abadeh may be traced to his instigation. In short,
it is to Soulet-ed-Dowleh’s interest that the telegraph route from Bushire to Shiraz
should be always unsafe, and that the telegraph route from Shiraz to Ispahan should be
unsafe during the summer months, in order that caravans should bo forced to use the
Firuzabad, Jirreh, and Sarhad routes according to the season. For instance, the attack
on Mr. Passek was almost certainly instigated by Soulet-ed-Dowleh for the achievement
of the above objects.
It is now necessary to consider the chances of a restoration of order in Jars by
the Persian Government with reference to the question of Soulet ed-Dowleh. I came
to Shiraz last March, believing that the situation in Fars was practically desperate.
Local study of the situation convinced me that this was not yet the case. I saw that
there were in Fars various elements which could be successfully utilised by a strong,
astute governor-general for the restoration of order. In appreciation of local situations
in Persia, we are perhaps apt to overlook the inherent divisions which disunite the
elements of disorder and often enable a weak Government to re-assert its authority.
The hosts of Kashgai sowars, the bands of hardy Boir Ahmedi riflemen, the many
thousands of other armed and rebellious tribesmen—all these are frequently cited to
demonstrate the impossibility of order being re-established by a Government which
possesses no efficient army. These conditions, however, have existed for years and
years; the only new factor is the debilitation of the Government owing to its financial
difficulties and the blow struck at authority by a revolutionary movement. In other
words, the Government is much weaker than formerly, but the divisions among the
elements opposed to it are as acute as ever. It w T as mainly this fact which made me