ملف رقم ٩٤٨ لسنة ١٩٠٩ "بلاد فارس: الوضع في الجنوب؛ حالة الطرق. الهجوم على السيد بيل. برنامج حرس الطرق". [و‎‎٧‎٣] (٧٤٤/١٥٠)

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['pfeds Document is tbG Proporty 01 His Britamiic Majesty’s GovGrmnent.l
PERSIA.
* -x .ys..
[December 19.]
CONFIDENTIAL.
Section 3.
[45639]
No. 1.
Sit G. Barclay to Sit Edward Grey.—(Received December 19 )
(No. 217.)
bir ’ T tt a 'V' r T 7 ' ,11 ^ , Tehran, November 2i, ISIQ.
. 1 , V . the hon o ur to forward the accompanying copy of a despatch Irom His
Majesty s acting consul at Shiraz. As you will notice, Mr. Smart’s recommendations
are based on the assumption that my note of the 14th October regarding the southern
roads accurately described the intentions of His Majesty’s Government in regard to
the policing of the Bashire-Ispahan road—a misapprehension which I have since
corrected.
But though Mr. Smart s despatch was written under a misapprehension, I venture
to forward it, as it contains an interesting exposition of the present situation in Bars,
from the pen of one who believes that the best course for the Persian Government would
be to remove Soulet-ed-Dowleh from his position as Ilkhani of the Kashgais, a view
which, though held by Sardar Assad, is not shared by the Persian Government.
I have informed Mr. Smart, in reply to this despatch, that in the circumstances I
do not propose to interfere in the Persian Government’s relations with Soulet.
I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.
Enclosure in No. 1.
Acting Consul Smart to Sir G. Barclay.
(No. 45.)
^ Shiraz, October 25, 1910.
WITH reference to my despatch No. 34 of the 25th July last and previous
correspondence regarding our attitude in the question of Soulet-ed-Dowleh, I venture
to suggest, for the consideration of yourself and Colonel Cox, that the moment has
now come when we can, with advantage, depart from our policy of neutrality in Ears
politics.
I understand from your telegram No. 72 of the 15th instant that His Majesty’s
Government are now prepared to take effective measures to ensure a reasonable amount
of security on the telegraph route from Bush ire to Ispahan, should the Persian Govern
ment fail to restore order along that route within three months. That being the case,
the main reason, as far as the interior of Ears is concerned, for our refraining from
throwing our moral influence openly into the scale against Soulet-ed-Dowleh would
seem no longer to exist. I have hitherto deprecated our declaring ourselves openly
against him for the obvious reason that, if, after we had done so, the Persian Government
had not suppressed him, our position in Ears would have been extremely awkward, even
dangerous. If, however, we are ready, in case of necessity, to take adequate measures
to ensure security along the the highway of our trade for rhe conveyance of our
merchandise, for the passage of our travellers, and for the employes and wires of the
Indo-European Telegraph Department, we can, it would seem, view with equanimity
the hostility of Soulet-ed-Dowleh, as far as the interior of Ears is concerned.
I have long ago expressed my opinion that the suppression of Soulet-ed-Dowleh is
imperative for the restoration of order in Ears. Time has only strengthened me in this
belief, and I venture now to offer a few observations on the general situation, with a
view to emphasising the incompatibility of order in Ears generally, and on the Bushire-
Ispahan telegraph route particularly, with the maintenance of Soulet-ed-Dowleh.
The root of the evil in Ears is the enmity existing between the Kawamis and the
Ilkhani of the Kashgais. It is this enmity which has caused both parties to incite their
respective followers to create disturbances at different times and at different places, with
the object of damaging each others position. Having once ordered their tribesmen to
plunder for particular objects, it became very difficult to prevent them from plundering
indiscriminately. Hence the present situation with the tribes no longer under the
control of their chiefs, who, from fear of each other, dared not take energetic measures
to chastise their rebellious followers. The interests of the two parties are so conflicting
[1805 *—3] B
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