ملف رقم ٧٥٧ لسنة ١٩٠٩ "الخليج الفارسي: تركيا والعدوان التركي (احتلال جزيرة الزخنونية. الموقف تجاه قضايا القرصنة. المدراء في الزبارة والعُديد والوكرة) العلاقات البريطانية مع تركيا في الخليج الفارسي" [ظ‎‎٩‎٥] (٤٩٥/١٩٥)

doubtful whether even the modified proposals of the Government of India
could be squared with the status quo. As a compromise the Government of
India proposed the revival of an agreement of 1868 made with a former
bhmkh but the foreign Office (18th February 1905), thought that this would
be ineffective, and the matter was reserved for consideration by the Defence
Committee along with the whole question of the Persian Gulf. It is not
known whether it was so considered, and it has not been heard of since
until oir G. Lowther s Despatch of 22nd August, from which quotation has
already been made, and the Foreign Office letter of 4th October, in which the
views of the India Office were asked for.
Cl e have in the present telegram the views of Lieutenant-Colonel Cox
and the Government of India. They are as follows :—
(Colonel Cox):—
“ 1 consider that it would be useless now to make treaty with Bin Thani
rndess we are prepared to do so openly, and to bring about elimination
of lurkish influence of Katr, as suggested in second item above
Without such simultaneous action existence of treaty would only be
source of danger to the Thani family from, the present Turkish regime
and they would themselves fight shy of it.
(Government of India) :—
“ We concur with Cox that no advantage would accrue from treaties with
Aalr Chiefs, and furthe that Chiefs would probably not now agree to
enter into treaties, unless the Turks can be induced to confine
themselves to their recognised possessions at Katif and UjairT
It will be observed that in 1904, when the local situation was ripe
Constantinople was not ready; and that now, when Constantinople is ready'
the local situation is not ripe. Sir G. Lowther in his despatch of 22nd August
savs that “the time may not be far distant when, as advocated by Lord
i, -^ ans downe m February 1905, a comprehensive, as opposed to piecemeal
treatment of outstanding questions in the Persian Gulf may
“ become imperative.” The nearest approach that has been m'ade to
anything comprehensive was Sir E. Grey’s Despatch of 17th October the
late ot which has been described. If the settlement is to be friendly there
must be some give and take. As to this Colonel Cox’s view is
U hcther achievement of above ends is possible by means of comprehensive
reciprocal compromise, or whether coercive measures will be necessary
is a question beyond my purview, but I beg to say that I can conceive
no quid pro quo which we could offer Porte in this sphere in exchanae
for withdrawal of her pretensions. It could perhaps be found in some
other sphereT
This will presumably be accepted. The only points of contact that we
have with Turkey in the neighbourhood of the Gulf are things that both of
us want and neither can afford to part with.
“ Should coercive measures (Colonel Cox says) be necessary, we can never
expect the recurrence of such a favourable junction locally as exists at
present The numerical strength of military posts in question has just
been reduced to a minimum under Nazim Pasha’s scheme for concen-
trahng troops at Bagdad; while we have strong squadron in the
Persian Gulf in connection with Arms Traffic, which would make naval
demonstration simple matter.”
4he Foreign Office, as has been mentioned above, have already contem
plated resort to force in the case of the mudirates in Katr, with the result
not uncommon m such cases—that it was proposed that India should perform
the task. If troops are to be employed, it is perhaps natural that thev should
be Indian troops But their employment would probably come within the
scope of 21 & 22 Viet. c. 106, s 55 : “ Except for preventing or repelling
actaal invasion of Her Majesty’s Indian possessions, or under other sudden
« T neces 5 lt y’ the revenues of India shall not, without the consent
of both Houses of larhament, be applicable to defray the expenses of any
„ military operation carried on beyond the external frontiers of such
possessions by Her Majesty’s forces charged upon such revenues.” It is