"ملف ٨/٣ شؤون أولاد الشيخ خزعل." [ظ‎‎١‎٨‎٠] (٥٠٨/٣٦٠)

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guarantees regarding the safety of life and property of those who were helping
the Sheikh—especially the Bakhtiari Ajnir Mujahid; (n) to withdraw all troops
from Arabistan, including Bebehan; (iii) to cancel the revenue settlement oi the
previous year and return to the pre-war basis; and (iv) to give a more specific
confirmation of his firmans. In addition, the Sheikh required a guarantee from
His Majesty’s Government against unfriendly acts by Beza Khan in the Future,
and asked whether they would sell him arms and ammunition secretly. Colonel
Peel added that he anticipated no danger to the pipe-line and that the Sheikh
was unlikely to make any move against Persian troops unless he were attacked
or reinforcements were sent towards Bebehan.
39. On September 13th Mr. Ovey was requested to instruct the Political
Besident to proceed to Mohammerah and hold language to the Sheikh in
accordance with the Foreign Office instructions of the 23rd August, and he was
also told to convey a message to the Prime Minister (then in Luristan) warning
him of the great danger to which he might be exposing South-West Persia. These
instructions were followed by others on the 17th September authorising Mr. Ovey
to negotiate with Beza Khan with a view to the acceptance of the Sheikh’s
conditions (i) and (iv) and as regards (ii) of a compromise that troops should
not be reinforced as long as the Sheikh undertook to behave properly. In addi
tion, a further message was to be sent to the Sheikh explaining what was being
attempted on his behalf, but stating that His Majesty’s Government could not
condone his warlike attitude or assist him in any way to defy the Persian Govern
ment, and that, unless he abandoned his warlike attitude, they could not hold
themselves responsible for the consequences. In the meantime, the Political
Besident had interviewed the Sheikh, his second son (Abdul Hamid), the
Bakbtiari Amir Mujahid and Colonel Biza Quli Khan (who had replaced
Colonel Baqir Khan at Shushtar but who had apparently thrown in his lot
with the Sheikh); all declared that no peace with Beza Khan was possible;
the Sheikh had telegraphed to the Majlis explaining that his opposition was
to Beza Khan personally and that it was hoped to persuade the Shah to return.
On September 16th the" Sheikh had also addressed a telegram to the foreign
legations in Tehran in the nature of a proclamation against the Prime Minister,
who was described as “a usurper and a transgressor of the Persian nation.”
The Foreign Office therefore felt it necessary to inform Mr. Ovey that Hisfc
Majesty’s Government had no wish to avoid the guarantees to the Sheikh so long
as he should maintain an attitude on which they were conditional, but that he
would not be justified in looking to them for support were he to kindle a war
and suffer defeat. The Foreign Office felt that it was essential that the atti
tude of His Majesty’s Government should be clearly understood by the Sheikh,
who might be led into the belief by other British contacts (e.g., local repre
sentatives of the oil company) that he would have the sympathy of the British
Government in his struggle.
40. Beza Khan, from whatever motive, reacted favourably to Mr. Ovey's
representations and practically placed himself in the hands of His Majesty’?
Government; he undertook to refrain from asking the Majlis to proclaim the
Sheikh a rebel and to approve warlike operations; he further undertook to
confirm the Sheikh’s firmans, to recapitulate all his previous assurances to the
Sheikh, and to guarantee the lives and properties of the Sheikh and his family
and also Amir Mujahid. In return, Beza Khan said he must insist on Amir f
Mujahid’s exile and the Sheikh’s absence from Persia for three months, during "
which time he would definitely undertake to refrain from any military action
or threats; he would also guarantee the Sheikh’s return, provided the latter
made a suitable declaration of submission. All these undertakings were neces
sarily contingent upon His Majesty’s Government succeeding in restoring the
status quo ante in Khuzistan.
41. The Foreign Office considered that Beza Khan was acting with
moderation and their only criticism of his attitude was that the proposed
insistence on the Sheikh’s temporary departure from Persia might bring about
a state of civil war. Mr. Bamsay MacDonald directed that our policy should
be to hold ourselves impartial and enjoin peace, adding that we should, of course,
lean to the regular authority and impress both sides accordingly. He informed
Mr. Ovey on the 22nd September that he, like Lord Curzon, had never opposed
Beza Khan’s policy of consolidating power in the hands of the Central Govern
ment, as the one wish of His Majesty’s Government was to see a strong and
unified Persia; he hoped, however, that Mr. Ovey would be able to persuade
Beza Khan to abstain from insisting upon what amounted to the temporary
banishment of the Sheikh and instructed him to persuade the latter to abstain
from mobilising his forces. The Sheikh, who expressed his confidence in the