ملف رقم ٣٢٠٨ لسنة ١٩٠٨، جزء ١، "الخليج الفارسي: قراصنة ديّر (الساحل الفارسي)" [و‎‎١‎٨‎٧] (٣٣٠/٣١٣)

No. 1501 of 1907.
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.
SECRET.
External.
To
The Right Hon’ble JOHN MORLEY, O.M.j
Sis Majesty’s Secretary of State for India,
Simla, the 5th September 1907,
Sir,
We have the honour to forward herewith copies of correspondence* regard
ing the conduct of the Sheikh of Koweit
* Letter from the Political Resident in the Persian i n taking Part in an expedition Organized
1907, Sh 1 enc\i C u 0 r n e8. dential) ’ dated the 28th July by the Sheikh of Mohammerah against
his rebellious tribesmen.
2 . It appears that Sheikh Khazal of Mohammerah found himself obliged
to take strong measures in his capacity as Persian Governor of the Mohammerah
District, in order to compel the tribesmen of the Beni Traf to pay their
revenue. Sheikh Mubarak, about the middle of June, proceeded to Moham-
merah in his steam-yacht for the purpose of supporting his friend. He took
with him a large quantity of small arms and ammunition, waterskins and
other articles which he handed over to Sheikh Khazal, and he subsequently
sent his vessel back for a second consignment. He also arranged, at Sheikh
KhazaPs request, to garrison the Mohammerah outpost of Kasbeh temporarily
with some of his own men, so as to free the Arab garrison for service with the
field force. The operations resulted in the surrender of the Beni Truf.
Although the operations in which Sheikh Khazal was engaged are described
merely as the reduction to order of a rebellious tribe the Beni Truf, we have
reason to believe from a note by Colonel Burton, when acting as Consul at
Mohammerah in 1904 , that the Sheikh has contemplated the reduction of
this tribe for some time, with the object of extending his unquestioned
territorial authority to Hawizeh on the Turkish frontier; so that the proceedings
have probably more than a temporary and local significance and may form
part of a scheme for consolidating the Arab power in these regions under a
central head.
3. We consider that by conveying arms and ammunition up the
Shatt-el-Arab in his private yacht without the authority or permission
of the Persian Government, the Sheikh ran the risk of involving himself in
serious difficulties with that Government or with the Turkish authorities, in
either of which cases diplomatic complications affecting His Majesty’s Gov
ernment might have arisen. The Persian Government might ^ reasonably
imagine that the prompt assistance rendered by Mubarak to Sheikh Khazal
would encourage the latter to assert his independence, should he find^ a conve
nient opportunity for doing so, while the Porte might regard the incident as an
indication of Mubarak’s growing disregard of Turkish suzerainty and he might