ملف رقم ١٢٤٧ لسنة ١٩١٢، جزء ٢، "الاتفاقية الأنجلو-تركية. قبول شيوخ الكويت والمحمرة لها." [ظ‎‎٣‎٨] (١٦٦/٧٢)

2
from bitter experience what Turkish officials were, would destroy whatever
good the proposed Agreement might hold, would weaken bis authority locally
and in the adjacent desert, wouldlead to constant strife and the formation of
parties among his people, whilst the Turkish Agency would become a focus
for domestic and foreign intrigue which would probably involve the British
Government itself at no distant date in difficulties at present not to be
foreseen. Having done my best to reassure the Shaikh I left and despatched
my first telegram to Fao.
4. On the following day the Shaikh came to see me with particular
reference to our conversation described above. I was surprised as he was not
very well at the time and even if in good health he seldom returns an
informal visit on the following day. He had evidently been considering what
1 had told him and had realised that, though his refusal to accept a Turkish
official in Kuwait might be sincere enough and couched in the most emphatic
terms, he would be unable to persist in that refusal should the British Gov
ernment have accepted the principle of representation and should the Porte
demand its fulfilment. On this occasion the Shaikh first reiterated his
previous arguments, every whit as vehemently, then he pointed out that
Colonel Meade’s Agreement of January 1899 was framed with the sole purpose
of preventing what we now suggested as likely to come about, viz.) the
advent of foreign officials in Kuwait. Further, we had expressly named the
Turkish Government, as one it was particularly desirable to exclude from
Kuwait, in the lease agreement for Bandar Shweikh, concluded in October
1907. Besides at our suggestion he had repeatedly rejected German over
tures though in doing so he was forfeiting the increase in his Customs
revenue which a German firm established in Kuwait would undoubtedly
have contributed. He urged that he had faithfully observed his part of
a bargain, which was now 14 years old, and had agreed willingly to it,
because he realised its advantages to himself as well to us and all he desired
w r as that the exclusion of foreigners might continue as heretofore. The Shaikh
then enquired what had been decided witli regard to tne Baghdad Kail way, in
reply to which I gave him the gist of what had appeared in the news tele
grams, observing that I had no official confirmation. The Shaikh evidently
had at the back of his mind that his interests had been used by us in
some bargain with the Turks, for he asked whether the settlement with
the Porte only concerned Kuwait and himself or other Gulf questions and
the Baghdad Railway. I replied that I fancied probably an agreement
had been reached on all questions, for that was indicated by the news
telegrams, though what I had received from the Residency related only to
Kuwait. He was exceedingly perturbed by the idea of having to accept a
Turkish official and reverted to the subject again and again saying there was
no need to agree to that item, as the Turks were a beaten and weak
nation now, apart from the fact that they never have had a representative
in the place; the only occasion on which they attempted to force one upon
him, a quarantine official some years before the establishment of the British
Political Agency, he had turned the man out summarily. He went on to
point out that from what I had told him, he failed to see why any concession
need have been made to the Porte, he was content to remain as he w^as, his
authority in the desert could not be disputed by the Turks, he was not
and never had been subject to them, his position as “ Ruler of Kuwait and
Chief of its tribes ” w as not disputed, and if the Turks liked to address him as
“ Kaimakam ” or by any other title, that did not alter the fact as he never so
subscribed himself. He had the very strongest objections to the residence of a
Turkish official in Kuwait, and he begged me to telegraph again, placing a
special boat at my disposal for the despatch of the telegram.
5. I have given the conversations in some detail in order that the
Shaikh’s attitude may be fully understood. To me his attitude is no surprise,
and whenever the opportunity has occurred, I have endeavoured to present the
local view, for it seemed important, seeing that these negotiations have been
conducted without the Shaikh having been given any idea as to their course,
that we should avoid concessions of a nature likely or calculated to disturb our