"ملف 29/6 العلاقات البريطانية مع خزعل، شيخ خرمشهر" [و‎‎٨] (٢٨/١٥)

13
found him in a depressed state of mind. The Sheikh spoke of his past services
to His Majesty’s Government and of how he had followed their advice in meeting
the wishes of the Persian Government; he was, however, convinced of the latter’s
hostile intentions towards himself, and attributed this primarily to his friendship
with the British Government. He wished to know whether the latter would
preserve him in his autonomous position, and also, if the Persian Government
made a direct attack on him, whether he should resist or submit. Colonel Trevor
expressed his inability to answer the first question on his own authority, and as
regards the latter, said that he could hardly advise the Sheikh to resist his own
Government. In reporting this conversation Colonel Trevor expressed his own
firm conviction that Reza Khan was desirous of reducing the power of the Sheikh
and raised the question of the 1914 assurances, pointing out that if we were to
stand by and watch the Persian Government take progressive steps to reduce the
Sheikh’s state of local autonomy, such an attitude would have a deplorable effect
locally, and the Sheikh, not without some reason on his side, would think himself
badly let down. Mr. Ovey’s comment on this report was to the effect that the
Persian Government had done nothing which was not in accordance with the
assurances given in the present year and that there did not appear to be any
special grounds for the Sheikh’s nervousness; and the view expressed in the
Foreign Office was that it was easy to understand the latter’s attitude, but that
there was no reason to suppose that His Majesty’s Government would not continue
to afford him adequate support by diplomatic means provided he paid his revenues
and gave the Persian Government no valid excuse for interference in his territorv.
* 38. A crisis arose early in August, partly due to the hostile attitude of
Colonel Baqir Khan (the Persian Commander at Shushtar), but principally to
the action of the Persian Government (inspired by their American financial
advisers) in informing the Sheikh that his firmans were invalid, having been
cancelled by a later firman of 1903. The Sheikh now expressed his determination
to resist any further interference, if necessary by force, and commenced taking
steps to secure the allegiance of his tribes. Mr. Ovey instructed His Majesty’s
Vice-Consul at Ahwaz to inform the Sheikh (a) that he realised the latter’s
anxiety, but that he could not believe that the Persian Government could legally
proceed to the lengths feared; {b) that he would call the Prime Minister’s
attention to the grave issues involved and hoped to prevent any precipitate action;
and (c) that if, instead of awaiting the results of the support of His Majesty’s
Government, the Sheikh were to commit any rebellious act, he would be puttin 0,
himself in the wrong and would prejudice his case with His Majesty’s Govern
ment, who remained always willing fully to su^yort his just claims.' Mr. Ovev
added that if the Sheikh thought that the Prime Minister’s position had been
shaken by recent political developments he was much mistaken and instructed
the Acting Consul to use every argument to keep the Sheikh quiet. On the
23rd August the Foreign Office telegraphed to Mr. Ovey informing him of reports
received from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company that the Sheikh was forming an
alliance with the Bakhtiari, Kashgai, &c., and was speaking of inviting the Shah
to return to Mohammerah. Mr. Ovey was instructed {a) to have a further message
sent to the Sheikh to the effect that, while he might rest assured that under
instructions from His Majesty’s Government, Mr. Ovey was doing his utmost to
induce the Persian Government to accord just consideration to the Sheikh’s
recognised rights and interests, he must be reminded that the British assurances
were dependent upon his loyalty to the central Government and that he should
refrain from any violent action which would be highly prejudicial both to his
own and British interests; and (b) to inform the Persian Prime Minister that
his recent administrative measures in South-West Persia appeared to be
inconsistent with repeated assurances given to His Majesty’s Government and
threatened vital British interests in those regions where they could not view
any untoward developments with indifference; Reza Khan should therefore be
urged to abstain from pressing matters to an issue. Mr. Ovey took active steps
and m the result the Prime Minister sent a message to the Sheikh sayino- that
toThp^ ™ intention of dispossessing him but that his attention was drawn
to the fact that he must not sell land to foreigners, and assuring him of support
m every way as long as he continued to be loyal. The Sheikh was not yet satisfied
especially as Reza Khan subsequently sent him a bombastic and tactless telegram’
and m conversation with His Majesty’s Consul at Ahwaz (Colonel Peel) expressed
his determination to overthrow Reza Khan or perish in the attempt Tn ht
th< i S f trug ? e . wa ? in evitable and there was more chance of success at that
time than later; ^e insisted that he was not taking the initiative but defending
his detost^'measure^onlv^^the ^p a ^° n M^^ dedared that he W0llld abandoa
ueiensive measures only if the Prime Minister agreed (i) to give written
E 4642/263/
34/1924.
E8892/263/
34/1924
E 7016/263/
34/1924.
E7136/236/
34/1924.
E 7574/263/
34/1924.
E7831/263/
34/1924.