ملف رقم ١٦٠ لسنة ١٩٠٣ "الخليج الفارسي: قطر؛ تعيين مديرين أتراك؛ مسألة معاهدة الحماية مع قطر" [و‎‎١‎١] (٨٦٠/٢٦)

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true that the employment of Indian troops in the naval blockade has
not been regarded as covered by the Act. But that can hardly be
described as a military operation, whereas the ejection of Turkish
garrisons could hardly be described otherwise. That, however, is perhaps
a detail, since Parliamentary discussion might be inevitable in any case.
As regard? the local situation, Colonel Cox’s views are borne out by recent-
reports. The Consul-General at Bagdad has more than once called attention
to the military weakness of the Province. In the August Summary (page 14)
he noted that after denuding a large part of the country of troops Nazim
Pasha had only been able to concentrate some 3,000 men at Bagdad, a
number not more than a sufficient garrison for the capital. In order to effect
this concentration the forces in Hasa have lately been considerably reduced ;
in July 570 men were withdrawn (140 from El Bidaa), and 200 more were to
follow. These were not to be replaced, but in cases of emergency troops
would be sent from Basra (letter from Political Agent, Bahrein, 24th July
1910, S. 1317/10), the garrison of which the Consul-General, Bagdad, put at
one battalion (September Summary, page 5). There remained 70 infantry (to
be raised to 100 probably), 40 police, and 6 guns at Katif ; 60 infantry and
4 guns at El Bidaa ; 50 infantry and 2 guns at Ujair; and about 600 infantry,
35 cavalry, 130 police, and 12 guns at Hofuf (the capital of Hasa, 40 miles
inland from Ujair). _ ^
It remains to consider the question of a treaty with the Katr Sheikh on
its merits. Arguments in favour of it are given on page 4 of Sir R. Ritchie’s
memorandum of 30th January 1905. Since that date the case for a treaty
has become somewhat stronger. For example, the Katr peninsula is the only
part of the coast of the Persian Gulf on which the arms traffic is not pro
hibited, and it tends to be a dumping ground in consequence ; thus we heard
on 5th December that a dhow under French colours had left Muscat in that
direction. If we had a treaty our chain of defences would be complete.
Again, with regard to the pearl fisheries, the Law Officers in answering
the reference made to them had no doubt as to the rights of the tiibe&
in such waters as may justly be considered territorial. Outside these
they were inclined to hold that the exclusive rights of the tribes might be
maintained to banks in regard to which their exclusive possession is capable
of historical proof ; but they considered that the point was not free from
doubt. And as regards the deeper waters they were of opinion that there
would be no reasonable chance of asserting with success the right of the
tribes to debar other nations from dredging. In these circumstances, the
Secretary of State agreed with the general conclusion of the Law Officers,
viz that it was not expedient to raise the question internationally by iorciblv
preventing vessels of foreign nationalties from fishing on the banks. And
he added “ The object in view may probably be attainable by indirect
methods.”’ (Secret Despatch No. 8, of 31st March 1905.) These indirect
methods which would consist mainly in putting difficulties in the way o!
interlopers, could probably only be successfully employed if our position
vis-a-vis of the tribes were such as would be secured to us by the proposed
trGcl^lGS -| -i
With regard to the terms of such treaties, it has been suggested that they
should follow the lines of the 1892 agreements with the 1 racial Uriels.
These provide (1) that the Chiefs will on no account enter into any agreement
or correspondence with any power other than the British Governnient; (-)
that without the assent of the British Government they will not consent to
the residence within their territory of the Agent of any other Government,
(3) that they will on no account cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise gne lor
occupation, "any part of their territory, save to the British Government.
b
CONCLUSIONS.
Achievement of above measure!, would completely consolidate our position
o ArTcoasi and in Gulf generally, especially regard to pearl
' fisher,i question, and, if it is ever to be brought seems
essential that action should be taken now. ,s delayed, the
suggested association of Turkey ivith Triple Alliance and increase