ملف رقم ١٦٠ لسنة ١٩٠٣ "الخليج الفارسي: قطر؛ تعيين مديرين أتراك؛ مسألة معاهدة الحماية مع قطر" [و‎‎٨] (٨٦٠/٢٠)

It is not quite clear what Colonel Cox means by making the agreement
effective. It is ineffective only in the sense that the circumstances have
never arisen in which it would take effect.
Presumably he means a making explicit of what is implicit in it, viz.,
a denial of Turkish sovereignty and an assertion of a British protectorate!
This would have to be considered with reference to its effect on Germany
as well as on Turkey. As regards the later agreement, there is the further
difficulty that the Sheikh’s claim to the island of Warba is not indisputable,
and as recently as March last Government of India, India Office, and Foreign
Office were all agreed that it was inadvisable to take any steps to raise the
question (S. 3130/10).
As regards the Turkish flag, it should be explained that the Sheikh of
^Koweit has flown it certainly since 1871, and possibly since 1856. In 1901,
when it was suggested by the Government of India that he should discontinue
the use of it, Lord Lansdowne rejected the proposal, and was “ not prepared to
support any action which could be interpreted as asserting the entire indepen-
“ deuce of the Sheikh of Koweit ” (Foreign Office letter, 24th August 1901,
S. 2251/01). The proposal was pressed later in the year, with the suggestion
that the Sheikh should fly the plain red Arab flag instead, but the Foreign
Office adhered to their objection (Foreign Office letter 24th September 1901,
S. 2366/01). In 1901 the (government of India suggested that the Sheikh
might retain the Turkish flag for use at Koweit and use a distinctive flag (he. a
Turkish flag with the word “ Koweit ” written across it in Arabic) elsewhere
(Secret letter No. 2247 of 8th December 1904), and this was agreed
to by the Foreign Office (letter of 18th February 1905, S. 2653). The
Sheikh concurred at first (S. 873/06), but later in the same year
demurred, on the ground that it “ was sure to get him into trouble ”
with the Turks, unless he was guaranteed by us against the consequences
(S. 2010/06). The Government of India thought that this “might involve us
in responsibilities of a somewhat extended character” (Secret Letter No. 193
of 27th December 1906, S. 2205). The Foreign Office were consulted
(27th January 1907), and the Ambassador at Constantinople was not opposed
to according this guarantee, thinking it “ very unlikely ” that the Turkish
Government would interfere with the Sheikh’s action (Sir N. O’Oonor’s
Despatch No. 105 of 18th February 1907); but the Foreign Office have never
replied to our letter, and the question has remained in a state of suspended
animation ever since.
It will have been observed, from the passage referred to above in the
Defence Committee’s proceedings, that the basis of our policy at Koweit has
purported to be adherence to the status quo. This has been a convenient
formula, but it is two-edged. The Turkish Government understand it in
their own sense (and what that sense is is shown by the fact that they have
made the Sheikh a Kaim-makam, and that they are applying the utmost
pressure to induce him to register himself as a Turkish subject). We under
stand it in our’s. One of the difficulties is to define our own meaning.
Thus, the Foreign Office were parties to the agreement of 1899. Yet in
September 1901 they declared that “ there does not appear to have been any
“ period since [1871] when His Majesty’s Government have not been ready
“ to admit at least the suzerainty, if not the actual sovereignty, of the Sultan.”
(Foreign Office letter of 24th September 1901). For practical purposes
the definition given by Sir T. Sanderson to Count Metternich a few
days earlier seems sufficient, viz., that the status (quo is “ the Sultan’s
authority as it exists in those parts.” Turkish authority “as it exists”
is limited to the Turkish title conferred on the Sheikh (it may be noted
that within the last few weeks the Sheikh has refused the offer of an
allowance to accompany the title), the use by the Sheikh of the Turkish flag,
and a Turkish guard sent to the island of Bubiyan, in violation of our
definition of the status quo, in 1902. It would appear, therefore, that while
there is nothing in the agreements that could not be made public without
violating the status quo, we could not deny Turkish suzerainty if the Foreign
Office view of 1901 is sound; nor could we assert a protectorate in view of
Lord Lansdowne’s pledge to the Turkish Government in 1901 so long as the
Turks themselves maintain the status quo (as we understand it), and do not
send troops to Koweit. A further question is whether the despatch of the
Turkish guard to Bubiyan Island does not absolve us from this pledge.