"الملف 35/134 III (A 54) صور: أمراء جعلان". [و‎‎٨‎٠] (٤٢٦/١٧٥)

7 -
of 6^. (It is not proposed for the ,resent to apply to
Sur the enhanced tariff, if eventua ly sanctioned.) Shaikh
Isa and the Imam have already acquiesced in this demand
of in other ports supplying the Interior.
into open hostility. At the Lioment they are friendly to
the central government, and have every reason to dislike
the Ban! Bu Ali for the indignities recently heaped .upon
them - see Appendix A. If the Jenab&h once see that the
government is in earnest, they will probably have enough
sense to realize, on the one hand their impotence in the
face of the State’s sea-power (the armed A1 Said), and on
the other their ability to pass on uost of the customs dues
to the tribes of the Interior,
possibilities.
Ox these^ tne least likely to happen is (b). As regards
(.c), the State might perhaps with skilful diplomacy secure
the cooperation of the Jenabah and of th e actual Inhabitants
of Aiqa, the maritime Banl Bu All. The most dangerous
possibility is (a). It la doubtful whether the Amirs of
Ja lan will acquiesce In the government's establishment of
a fortified post In Alqa, yet this la essential if the
Bani 3u Ali are to be prevented from again appointing their
on wall and customs offld als. On the other hand, the
more prepared and the more resolute the tw© governments
are, the smaller the chances of a conflict with the a.m
Bu AH,
(a) During recent years the State of Muscat's hold over
Sur and Its neighbourhood has gradually weakened.
(bj This weakening of control is affecting customs colletlorB
(c) Converting the Jenabah's present semblance of loyalty
11) To sum up.