"ملف 12/5 (1 A/23) الإدارة - أنشطة البحرية الفارسية" [و‎‎١‎٧] (١٨٤/٣٣)

on the high seas as well as in Arab territorial waters. ihey
suggest, therefore, that the instructions should take the form
that, in the event of an Arab dhow being interfered with in the
presence of a British warship, the latter should communicate
with the Persian warship, warn her that ane is committing an
illegal act and, if necessary, take the dhow in tow and take
such other steps as are necessary to ensure tnat sne is not
further interfered with. They would point out tnat unless tne
instructions are in the sense suggested above, there is always
the possibility, however remote, that a Persian war vessel might
persist in her interference in the presence of and in spite of
remonstrances by a British ’warship. If in such circumstances
no attempt were imde to resist the illegal action of the Persian
warship the effect upon our prestige amongst the Arabs would be
likely to be serious.
5© Ah additional reason for issuing instructions in tne sense
proposed above is that (in spite of recent verbal communications
by individual Persian officials) it seems likely tnat it will
shortly be necessary to make a formal communication to tne
Persian Government in the sense proposed in paragrapn 6 of Mr.
Seymour’s memorandum - namely that JBfjex orders nave been given
to H.If. Ships to prevent any interference with Arab dnows on tne
high seas. In this connection, fneir herds concur with tne
views expressed in paragraphs 4 and 5 of tne Political Resident'
semi-official letter of tne 21st May. Any divergence between
the language used at Tehran and tne instructions issued to H.a.
Ships would clearly be open to objection.
5. Another suggestion contained in Mr.Seymour’s memorandum
is that in waters claimed by Persia as territorial, but not
admitted as such by His Majesty’s Government, tne same course
should /