"ملف 8/16 تقارير استخباراتية بشأن البحرين" [و‎‎١‎٤‎٥] (٤٣٢/٢٨٩)

SECRET.
Intelligence Summary of the
Political Agent, Bahrain, for
No.12 of 1942 . the period 16th to 30th June
1942.
112. Shipping .
See Appendix to this Summary.
113. Movements of Officials .
The Political Agent and Captain Dixon circumnavigated
Bahrain Island on June 19th. The journey, which was performed
in the Bahrain Government’s Police launch, took just over
twelve hours.
114. Notable Visitors.
Generals Brereton, Alexander and Adler arrived in
Bahrain by air from India on June 26th and left in a Westerly
direction on June 27th. Their night’s stay in Bahrain was
involuntary, being caused by weather conditions.
115. Royal Air Force Levies.
Reference para 84 of Intelligence Summary No.10 of
1942 in which doubt was expressed whether the full number of
recruits required at Dubai and Sharjah would be forthcoming.
At Dubai 104 of the 120 men required have been en
listed and the O.C. Levies expects to recruit the balance
within a week or ten days. At Sharjah only 52 of the 240 men
required have been enlisted, and it will obviously be necessary
to open the ranks of the Sharjah Levies to recruits from Dubai.
116. Defence .
During the period under report military forces in
Bahrain received a very considerable accession to their strength.
The Bahrain Government have been consistently helpful
in placing at the disposal of the various Services land, build
ings etc. required for Defence purposes.
117. Air Raid Alarm .
At about 2.15 p.m. on June 21st a 'Red* Air Raid
warning was received from Basrah. The Bahrain Petroleum
Company was immediately informed, and precautionary measures
were taken. The ’All Clear' was received half an hour later.
In the meantime, however, unnecessary confusion had been caused
owing to the receipt by the Naval Base of a telephone message,
sent by an unknown person at Awali, to the effect that a bomb
had been dropped on the Refinery. The author of this message
has not been traced, and it cannot therefore be ascertained
whether it was due to deliberate knavery, to a perverted sense
of humour, or merely to hysteria.
Regarded as an exercise, the Air Raid warning was
useful in that it brought to notice a number of imperfections
in existing A.R.P. arrangements. Bazaar speculation about
the reason for the warning was as varied and imaginative as
one would expect in Bahraini but it is of interest that gossips
and rumour-mongers unanimously placed the danger in the East,
from the Japanese, rather than in the North or West, from the
Germans.
118. Economic .
TIT Food Supplies .
Reference para 103 (i) of Intelligence Summary No.11
of 1942 in which it was reported that the position arising out
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